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SECTION C.18
REACTION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
C. 18-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-103
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01020-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDACID: 103
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA NOW RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED AND THAT THIS ITEM
AND FAILURE MODE BE PLACED ON THE CIL. A FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT
SECONDARY REG IS NOT DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT. IOA RECOMMENDS THE
ADDITION OF A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS (FAILS OPEN) REGARDING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON NSTS 22206
GROUNDRULE (8/21/87, P. 2-13, 2.3.4.c) . A FAILED OPEN ISOL VALVE
IS DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT VIA TALKBACK DISPLAY. THE REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B TEST SHOULD BE APPLIED ONLY TO THE ISOL VALVE SINCE THE
UNLIKE REDUNDANT REGULATOR IS IDENTIFIED SEPARATELY IN THE
FMEA/CIL. THAT IS, AN UNDETECTABLE REG FAILURE SHOULD NOT CAUSE A
B SCREEN FAILURE FOR THE DETECTABLE ISOL VALVE FAILURE. HOWEVER,
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED SINCE ONE LEVEL OF
REDUNDANCY (REG) CAN BE LOST WITHOUT BEING DETECTED. ALSO, THE
NASA RCS FMEA/CIL ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE DETECTABILITY OF ALL
REDUNDANT ITEMS IN DETERMINING B SCREEN PASSAGE OR FAILURE. IOA
AGREES WITH THIS PRACTICE. FOR CONSISTENCY WITHIN THE RCS
FMEA/CIL, THIS B SCREEN SHOULD BE FAILED.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-103A
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
103
HE ISOL A & B VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"INTERNAL LEAKAGE" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-I01020-3 (3/IR
PPP, FAILS OPEN) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS B SCREEN ISSUE. WITH ONE HELIUM ISOL VALVE OPEN,
INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE CLOSED PARALLEL VALVE IS UNDETECTABLE, BUT
HAS NO EFFECT. IF BOTH VALVES ARE CLOSED AND ONE VALVE IS LEAKING
INTERNALLY, THE EFFECTS ARE DETECTABLE VIA PRESSURE SENSORS IN THE
HELIUM TANK AND/OR THE PROPELLANT TANK.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-104
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01020-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 104
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR AND PLACED
ON THE CIL. INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND SUBSEQUENT
INABILITY TO DEPLETE PROP COULD RESULT IN VIOLATION OF X CG LIMIT.
FINAL RESODUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, & MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-1-
FC6242-I (IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X
CG MANAGEMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS
DONE IN IOA AND GN&C CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO
MEET THE FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP
ISN'T COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED HE ISOL VLVS, THE X
CG LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG
LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE
NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH FAILURES MUST OCCUR, PARTIAL ULLAGE
CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-109
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
109
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED
ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA/CIL SHOULD BE 12.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II2
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
112
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] IN]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR AND PLACED
ON THE CIL. INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND SUBSEQUENT
INABILITY TO DEPLETE PROP COULD RESULT IN VIOLATION OF X CG LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, & MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-1-
FC6242-I (IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X
CG MANAGEMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS
DONE IN IOA AND GN&C CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO
MEET THE FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP
IS NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED HELIUM REGS, THE X
CG LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT THE
POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS
ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH FAILURES MUST BE
PRESENT, PARTIAL ULLAGE CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE",
AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A
IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE MODE, OR A NEW FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS
RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE
CORRECTED. IOA ACCEPTS B SCREEN FAILURE. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET
RCS-212 FOR RATIONALE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II3
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
113
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-I01030-2 (3/IR
PPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS 2/IR ISSUE (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-II2 FOR RATIONALE).
IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS B SCREEN ISSUE. THIS FAILURE WOULD BE
DETECTABLE BEFORE LAUNCH AND AT SOME POINT ON-ORBIT SINCE ONLY ONE
FLOW PATH IS OPEN AT A TIME DURING PAD PRE-PRESS AND ON-ORBIT.
HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES
WHEN BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE USED SIMULTANEOUSLY (ASCENT AND ENTRY),
WHEN THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-7
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II4
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
114
HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). IOA ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED THE
PARALLEL HELIUM PATHS TO BE REDUNDANT FOR THIS FAILURE (2/IR), BUT
NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A i/i.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1, I/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-8
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II5
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
115
HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH
SENSING PORT). HOWEVER, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY NASA/RI
IN THE OMS SUBSYSTEM ON FMEA 03-3-1004-3 (3/2R PFP). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE ALSO BE COVERED FOR THE RCS
REGULATOR WITH THE SAME RATIONALE USED IN OMS. IOA WITHDRAWS 2/IR
PPP CRIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST CASE REGULATOR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE IS COVERED ON 03-2F-I01013-I (i/i). THE PROPOSED
IOA FAILURE MODE IS A LESS SEVERE CASE OF THE FAILURE MODE COVERED
ON 03-2F-I01013-I AND, THEREFORE, NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE RCS
FMEA/CIL. HOWEVER, FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS AND OMS IDENTICAL
ITEMS, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD ALSO BE
ADDRESSED IN THE RCS FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-9
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II7
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
117
HE PRESS REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/1R FFP ASSIGNMENT. IOA ORIGINALLY
IDENTIFIED THIS AS A TWO-SEAL COUPLING RATHER THAN A MULTIPLE SEAL
0032 COUPLING. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS
FMEA SHOULD BE 12. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-II9
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01095-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
119
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR AND PLACED ON THE CIL. WITH SERIES POPPETS FAILED OPEN, THE
CONTAMINATION OF REGULATORS BY PROP OR PROP VAPORS COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF PROP TANK REPRESS CAPABILITY AND INABILITY TO USE OR
DEPLETE FRCS PROP. THIS COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND LOSS OF LIFE OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
FAILURE OF ONE POPPET UNDETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT (FAIL B SCREEN).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA ACCEPTS 3/3 BASED ON INPUTS FROM OMS AND
RCS SSMs: THE REGS ARE DESIGNED TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH PROP AND
HAVE PASSED 90 DAY PROP EXPOSURE TEST. ALSO, ENOUGH TIME DOES NOT
EXIST DURING A MISSION FOR PROP EXPOSURE TO CAUSE A REG FAILURE.
ANY PROBLEM RESULTING FROM PROP EXPOSURE ON THE GROUND WOULD BE
DETECTED DURING PRELAUNCH OPS. THE SSMs AGREED THAT THE IOA
CONCERNS WERE NOT IMPOSSIBLE, BUT CONSIDER THE PROBABILITY OF SUCH
OCCURRENCES TO BE "INFINITESIMALLY SMALL". IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
2/IR BASED ON ULTIMATE WORST-CASE POSSIBLE EFFECTS, BUT ACCEPTS
JUDGMENT OF SSMs. SINCE THESE FAILURE MODES CAN CAUSE IR
REGULATOR FAILURES (SEE CAUSES ON 03-2F-I01030-I, 03-2A-201030-I,
& 03-2A-201030-2), THEY SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS IR's.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-11
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-120
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01095-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
120
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] [ ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR. INABILITY
TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO DEPLETE PROP
COULD RESULT IN VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, AND MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-1-
FC6242-I (IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X
CG MANAGEMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS
DONE IN IOA AND GN&C CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO
MEET THE FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP
IS NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED CHECK VLV POPPETS,
THE X CG LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT THE
POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS
ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH FAILURES MUST BE
PRESENT, PARTIAL ULLAGE CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE",
AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A
IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE MODE, OR A NEW FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS
RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE
CORRECTED.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-121
03-2F-I01091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
121
QUADCHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/IR FFP ASSIGNMENT. IOA ORIGINALLY
IDENTIFIED THIS AS A TWO-SEAL COUPLING RATHER THAN A MULTIPLE SEAL
0032 COUPLING. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS
FMEA SHOULD BE 12. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-128
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-111110-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
128
PROP CHANNEL SCREENS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE P.A.D. COMPONENTS BE ITEMIZED IN THE ITEM
LIST OR FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION SECTIONS TO SHOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT
IS COVERED BY THIS FMEA/CIL. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE "HIGH
G" DISCUSSION BE REMOVED FROM THE FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS EDITORIAL
REVISIONS AS STATED, HOWEVER NO LONGER CONSIDERS THIS
RECOMMENDATION TO BE AN "ISSUE". THE CRITICALITY IS CORRECT FOR
THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-130
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COUPLING
FRCS
130
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECK-OUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/IR FFP ASSIGNMENT. IOA ORIGINALLY
IDENTIFIED THIS AS A TWO-SEAL COUPLING RATHER THAN A MULTIPLE-SEAL
0032 COUPLING. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS
ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE FIRE HAZARD,
HAZARD TO GROUND CREW, AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-140
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
140
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (BURST DISK INTERNAL
LEAKAGE). IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE TO BE CREDIBLE AND
RECOMMENDS IT BE ADDED TO 03-2F-I01060-5. THE FAILURE HISTORY OF
THE BURST DISK INCLUDES THIS FAILURE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST-CASE BURST DISK
LEAKAGE IS COVERED ON 03-2F-I01060-5 (BURST DISK RUPTURES
PREMATURELY, 2/1R PFP). THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS A LESS SEVERE
CASE OF THE FAILURE MODE COVERED ON 03-2F-I01060-5 AND, THEREFORE,
NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE RCS FMEA/CIL. THE FMEA/CIL NEED ONLY
ADDRESS THE WORST-CASE FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-142
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-101091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
142
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED
ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA/CIL SHOULD BE 12.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-146
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
146
GROUNDMANUALISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1, I/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FMEA INCLUDE PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-147
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
147
PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
PROP TANK ISOL VALVES. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE,
HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-148
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-i02120-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
148
PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ N ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS I/1 CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW
TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS
I/I ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP CAPABILITY DURING
RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT (BASED ON A
POSSIBLE INCOMPLETE DUMP) IF SUCH CAPABILITY EXISTS IN THE FUTURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR
AND PLACED ON THE CIL. INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP
COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO PERFORM ET SEP, OR VIOLATION OF THE
ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ANY UPSTREAM CONTAMINATION CAN AFFECT ALL
REDUNDANCY.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA MET WITH G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 TO
DISCUSS IR/2 ISSUE. IOA ACCEPTS SSM'S JUDGMENT AND RELUCTANTLY
WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH VLVS
MUST FAIL, AND THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE". HOWEVER, IOA
STRONGLY RECOMMENDS A IR/2 PPF FOR THIS FAILURE MODE BASED ON THE
ABOVE RATIONALE. IOA CONTENDS THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE TWO
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS COULD RESULT IN LOSS ET SEP CAPABILITY OR
VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS
PROP AFTER THE DEORBIT BURN. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THIS
RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I (IR/2) SHOULD BE
CORRECTED.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-20
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-150
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02120-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
150
PROP TK ISOL VLV 1/2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS i/1 ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT
(BASED ON POSSIBLE INADEQUATE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS IN
THE FUTURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED CLOSED AND FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN FAILURE MODES BE UPGRADED TO 2/IR AND PLACED ON THE
CIL. INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO PERFORM ET SEP, OR VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA MET WITH G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 TO
DISCUSS IR/2 ISSUE. IOA ACCEPTS SSM'S JUDGMENT AND RELUCTANTLY
WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH VALVES
MUST FAIL, AND THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE". HOWEVER, IOA
STRONGLY RECOMMENDS A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE MODE BASED ON THE
ABOVE RATIONALE. IOA CONTENDS THAT TWO FAILED CLOSED PROP TANK
ISOL VLVS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF FRCS ET SEP CAPABILITY AND
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT DUE TO INABILITY TO
DUMP FRCS PROP AFTER THE DEORBIT BURN. THESE VALVES ARE ALWAYS
OPEN DURING FLIGHT, HOWEVER A SWITCH FAILURE COULD CAUSE A VALVE
TO GO FROM OPEN TO FAILED CLOSED. THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THIS
RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-1 (IR/2) SHOULD BE
CORRECTED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-152
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02120-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
152
PROP TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A I/i ABORT CRIT
(BASED ON POSSIBLE INADEQUATE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS IN
THE FUTURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED CLOSED AND FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN FAILURE MODES BE UPGRADED TO 2/IR AND PLACED ON THE
CIL. INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO PERFORM ET SEP, OR VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT.
F_NAL RESO_UTION: IOA MET WITH G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 TO
DISCUSS IR/2 ISSUE. IOA ACCEPTS SSM'S JUDGMENT AND RELUCTANTLY
WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH VALVES
MUST FAIL, AND THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE". HOWEVER, IOA
STRONGLY RECOMMENDS A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE MODE BASED ON THE
ABOVE RATIONALE. IOA CONTENDS THAT TWO FAILED CLOSED PROP TANK
ISOL VLVS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF FRCS ET SEP CAPABILITY AND
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT DUE TO INABILITY TO
DUMP FRCS PROP AFTER THE DEORBIT BURN. THESE VALVES ARE ALWAYS
OPEN DURING FLIGHT, HOWEVER A SWITCH FAILURE COULD CAUSE A VALVE
TO GO FROM OPEN TO FAILED CLOSED. THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THIS
RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I (IR/2) SHOULD BE
CORRECTED.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-22
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-158
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
158
MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] IN]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS THESE FAILURE MODES
BE UPGRADED TO IR/2. CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES COULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND VIOLATION OF ENTRY X CG
LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I
(IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG
MANAGEMENT WASN'T CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN
IOA AND GNC CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE
FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP ISN'T
COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD VLVS, THE X CG
LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG
LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE
NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH TWO FAILURES MUST OCCUR, PARTIAL ULLAGE
CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-23
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-159
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
FRCS
159
MANIFOLD I, GROUNDPURGE/DRAINCOUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-24
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-162
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
FRCS
162
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] [N]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS THESE FAILURE MODES
BE UPGRADED TO IR/2. CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES COULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND VIOLATION OF ENTRY X CG
LIMIT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I
(IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG
MANAGEMENT WASN'T CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN
IOA AND GNC CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE
FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP ISN'T
COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD VLVS, THE X CG
LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG
LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE
NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH TWO FAILURES MUST OCCUR, PARTIAL ULLAGE
CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-163
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
163
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-166
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
166
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] [N]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS THESE FAILURE MODES
BE UPGRADED TO IR/2. CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES COULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND VIOLATION OF ENTRY X CG
LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I
(IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG
MANAGEMENT WASN'T CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN
IOA AND GNC CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE
FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP ISN'T
COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD VLVS, THE X CG
LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG
LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE
NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH TWO FAILURES MUST OCCUR, PARTIAL ULLAGE
CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C°18-27
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-167
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
167
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
_INAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-28
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-170
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
170
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] [ N ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS THESE FAILURE MODES
BE UPGRADED TO IR/2. CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES COULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND VIOLATION OF ENTRY X CG
LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I
(IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG
MANAGEMENT WASN'T CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN
IOA AND GNC CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE
FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP ISN'T
COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD VLVS, THE X CG
LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG
LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE
NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH TWO FAILURES MUST OCCUR, PARTIAL ULLAGE
CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RCS-171
03-2F-i01080-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
171
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-175
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
175
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-177
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 177
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
PRIMARY MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-177A
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-102170-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 177
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-178
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
178
MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS I/i CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW TO
A THRUSTER COULD CAUSE BURN-THROUGH. IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT
ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP CAPABILITY DURING RTLS &
TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT (BASED ON A POSSIBLE
INCOMPLETE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS IN THE FUTURE. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON
THE FMEA/CIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-I02110-I (3/IR
PPP, PRIMARY VALVES) AND 03-2F-I02170-I (2/2, VERNIER VALVES).
IOA WITHDRAWS 2/IR ISSUE ON PRIMARY VALVES (SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEETS RCS-158, 162, 166, & 170 FOR RATIONALE).
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-179
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121308-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
179
JET ALIGNMENTBELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE "D" EFFECTS BE REVISED. IOA CONSIDERS
LEAKAGE OF PROP TO BE CRITICAL AFTER ET SEP ALSO, AS WELL AS A
HAZARD TO EVA AND GROUND CREWS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT "ISOL
VALVE RELIEF DEVICE FAILURE TO RELIEVE" AND "FAILURE OF LINE
BELLOWS TO DEFLECT" BE ADDED AS CAUSES ON THIS FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA NO LONGER CLASSIFIES THIS AS AN "ISSUE"
SINCE THE CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. HOWEVER, IOA DOES RECOMMEND
THAT THE "D" EFFECTS BE REVISED AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-181
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
181
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[I/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS ON".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED OPEN MODE BE UPGRADED TO A i/i
BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206, ANY SINGLE
FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CI_ASSIFIED AS A i/i.
PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA RECOMMENDS A IR/2 FPP
CRITICALITY. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-186. THE SSM STATES THAT
THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE
THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE. ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER
HOUSING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-182
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
182
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE) FOR THE THRUSTER SOLENOID VALVE.
_NAD RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-183
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
183
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS i/I CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW TO
A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS i/i
ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP CAPABILITY DURING
RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A I/i ABORT CRIT (BASED ON A
POSSIBLE INCOMPLETE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS IN THE
FUTURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE
ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-121310-3 (3/IR
FPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS 2/IR ISSUE FOR YAW THRUSTERS (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-
186 FOR RATIONALE).
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-185
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
185
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/I BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS-22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A i/1. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW.
FINAL R_SOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. PER THE
SSM'S PHILOSOPHY, THE NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE SSM STATES
THAT THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE
WOULD BE THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE. ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE
THRUSTER HOUSING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-186
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
186
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT CRIT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED
CLOSED MODE FOR PRIMARY +/-Y JETS BE UPGRADED TO IR/2. LOSS OF
BOTH +Y OR -Y JETS MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND
VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT.
FINA_ RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH SSM, MOD, BOEING, &
RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IR/2 ISSUE AND INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS
CRIT (IR/3) AND GNC FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I (IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE
OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG MANAGEMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN RCS
CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN IOA AND GN&C CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT
FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE FWD X CG LIMIT. THEREFORE, IF A
PLANNED DUMP ISN'T COMPLETED BECAUSE TWO YAW JETS ON SAME SIDE ARE
FAILED, THE X CG LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT
THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY
WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH TWO JETS
MUST FAIL, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RCS-187
03-2F-121310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
187
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS-22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A i/I. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A I/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA RECOMMENDS A IR/2 FPP
CRITICALITY. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-186. THE SSM STATES THAT
THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE
THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE. ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER
HOUSING.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-41
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-189
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
189
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A I/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS-22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A i/I. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW.
FINAL RESODUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A I/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. PER THE
SSM'S PHILOSOPHY, THE NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE SSM STATES
THAT THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE
WOULD BE THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE. ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE
THRUSTER HOUSING.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-42
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-192
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-131310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
192
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS ON".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED OPEN MODE BE UPGRADED TO A i/I
BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206, ANY SINGLE
FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS A I/I.
PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE
SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A I/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. PER THE
SSM'S PHILOSOPHY, THE NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-43
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-194
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
194
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ I /i ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] ix]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[I/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, I/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-44
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-195
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-131310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
195
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A i/i. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND
CREW. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS
INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. PER THE
SSM'S PHILOSOPHY, THE NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-45
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-200
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201070-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
200
HELIUM FILL COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED TO THE FAILURE
MODES ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE
WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-46
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-202
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 202
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA NOW RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED AND THAT THIS ITEM
AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDED TO THE CIL. A FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT
SECONDARY REG IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON NSTS 22206
GROUNDRULE (8/21/87, P. 2-13, 2.3.4.c). A FAILED OPEN ISOL VALVE
IS DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT VIA TALKBACK DISPLAY. THE REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B TEST SHOULD BE APPLIED ONLY TO THE ISOL VALVE SINCE THE
UNLIKE REDUNDANT REGULATOR IS IDENTIFIED SEPARATELY IN THE
FMEA/CIL. THAT IS, AN UNDETECTABLE REG FAILURE SHOULD NOT CAUSE A
B SCREEN FAILURE FOR THE DETECTABLE ISOL VALVE FAILURE. HOWEVER,
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED SINCE ONE LEVEL OF
REDUNDANCY (REG) CAN BE LOST WITHOUT BEING DETECTED. ALSO, THE
NASA RCS FMEA/CIL ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE DETECTABILITY OF ALL
REDUNDANT ITEMS IN DETERMINING B SCREEN PASSAGE OR FAILURE. IOA
AGREES WITH THIS PRACTICE. FOR CONSISTENCY WITHIN THE RCS
FMEA/CIL, THIS B SCREEN SHOULD BE FAILED.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-47
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-202A
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 202
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"INTERNAL LEAKAGE" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-201020-2 (3/IR
PPP, FAILS OPEN) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS B SCREEN ISSUE. WITH ONE HELIUM ISOL VALVE OPEN,
INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE CLOSED PARALLEL VALVE IS UNDETECTABLE, BUT
HAS NO EFFECT. IF BOTH VALVES ARE CLOSED AND ONE VALVE IS LEAKING
INTERNALLY, THE EFFECTS ARE DETECTABLE VIA PRESSURE SENSORS IN THE
HELIUM TANK AND/OR THE PROPELLANT TANK.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-48
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-208
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
208
HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
03-2F-I01070-I. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA IS INCORRECT.
_INAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-49
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-211
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
211
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED. A FAILED CLOSED REG WOULD
NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG OPERATION (ASCENT). IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
F_AL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE WHEN BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE OPEN
(AS DURING ASCENT AND ENTRY). HOWEVER, ONLY ONE OF THE PARALLEL
FLOW PATHS IS USED AT A TIME FOR PAD PRE-PRESS AND ON-ORBIT.
THEREFORE, THESE FAILURES WOULD BE DETECTABLE BEFORE LAUNCH OR AT
SOME POINT DURING THE MISSION ON-ORBIT. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES WHEN BOTH PATHS ARE USED
S IMULTANEOUS LY.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-50
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-212
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
212
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED. A FAILED CLOSED REG WOULD
NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG OPERATION (ASCENT). IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE WHEN BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE OPEN
(AS DURING ASCENT AND ENTRY). HOWEVER, ONLY ONE OF THE PARALLEL
FLOW PATHS IS USED AT A TIME FOR PAD PRE-PRESS AND ON-ORBIT.
THEREFORE, THESE FAILURES WOULD BE DETECTABLE BEFORE LAUNCH OR AT
SOME POINT DURING THE MISSION ON-ORBIT. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES WHEN BOTH PATHS ARE USED
SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-51
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-213
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
213
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
IOA ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED THE PARALLEL HELIUM FLOW PATHS TO BE
REDUNDANT FOR THIS FAILURE (2/IR), BUT NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE
AS A I/i.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
201013-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-52
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-214
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
214
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH
SENSING PORT). HOWEVER, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY NASA/RI
IN THE OMS SUBSYSTEM ON FMEA 03-3-1004-3 (3/2R PFP). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE ALSO BE COVERED FOR THE RCS
REGULATOR WITH THE SAME RATIONALE USED IN OMS. IOA WITHDRAWS 2/IR
PPP CRIT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST CASE REGULATOR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE IS COVERED ON 03-2F-I01013-I (i/I). THE PROPOSED
IOA FAILURE MODE IS A LESS SEVERE CASE OF THE FAILURE MODE COVERED
ON 03-2F-I01013-I AND, THEREFORE, NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE RCS
FMEA/CIL. HOWEVER, FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS AND OMS IDENTICAL
ITEMS, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD ALSO BE
ADDRESSED IN THE RCS FMEA/CIL.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-53
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-216
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COUPLING
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
216
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/IR FFP ASSIGNMENT. IOA ORIGINALLY
IDENTIFIED THIS -0032 COUPLING AS A -0018 COUPLING. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
03-2F-I01070-I. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA IS INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-54
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-218
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201095-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
218
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[N]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR PFP AND PLACED ON THE CIL. WITH SERIES POPPETS FAILED OPEN,
THE CONTAMINATION OF REGULATORS BY PROP OR PROP VAPORS COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF PROP TANK REPRESS CAPABILITY AND INABILITY TO
USE OR DEPLETE ARCS PROP. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ET SEP
CONTROL, LOSS OF ENTRY CONTROL, AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY
MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS. FAILURE OF ONE POPPET IS UNDETECTABLE DURING
FLIGHT (FAIL B SCREEN).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA ACCEPTS 3/3 BASED ON INPUTS FROM OMS & RCS
SSMs: THE REGS ARE DESIGNED TO BE PROP COMPATIBLE AND HAVE PASSED
90 DAY PROP EXPOSURE TEST. ALSO, ENOUGH TIME DOESN'T EXIST DURING
A MISSION FOR PROP EXPOSURE TO CAUSE A REG FAILURE. ANY PROBLEM
RESULTING FROM PROP EXPOSURE ON THE GROUND WOULD BE DETECTED
DURING PRELAUNCH OPS. THE SSMs AGREED THAT THE IOA CONCERNS WERE
NOT IMPOSSIBLE, BUT CONSIDER THE PROBABILITY OF SUCH OCCURRENCES
TO BE "INFINITESIMALLY SMALL". IOA STILL RECOMMENDS 2/IR BASED ON
ULTIMATE WORST CASE EFFECTS, BUT ACCEPTS THE JUDGMENT OF THE SSMs.
SINCE THESE FAILURE MODES CAN CAUSE IR REG FAILURES (SEE CAUSES ON
03-2F-I01030-I, 03-2A-201030-I, & 03-2A-201030-2), THEY SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS iR's.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-55
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-220
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
220
QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
03-2F-I01070-I. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA IS INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-56
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-227
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-211110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
227
PROP CHANNEL SCREENS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE P.A.D. COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE
ITEMIZED IN THE ITEM LIST OR FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTIONS SECTIONS TO
SHOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT IS COVERED ON THIS FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS EDITORIAL
REVISIONS TO THE EFFECTS AS SHOWN, HOWEVER NO LONGER CONSIDERS
THESE RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE AN "ISSUE". THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNED
IS CORRECT FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-57
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-229
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COUPLING
ARCS
229
PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECK-OUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND
EVA CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-58
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-233
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
233
PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHECK-OUT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND
EVA CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-59
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-235
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
235
PROP TK PLENUM SCREEN CHECK-OUT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND
EVA CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-60
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-241
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
241
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (BURST DISK INTERNAL
LEAKAGE). IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE TO BE CREDIBLE AND
RECOMMENDS IT BE ADDED TO 03-2F-I01060-5. THE FAILURE HISTORY OF
THE BURST DISK INCLUDES THIS FAILURE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST-CASE BURST DISK
LEAKAGE IS COVERED ON 03-2F-I01060-5 (BURST DISK RUPTURES
PREMATURELY, 2/IR PFP). THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS A LESS SEVERE
CASE OF THE FAILURE MODE COVERED ON 03-2F-I01060-5 AND, THEREFORE,
NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE RCS FMEA/CIL. THE FMEA/CIL NEED ONLY
ADDRESS THE WORST-CASE FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-61
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-243
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
243
RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
03-2F-I01070-I. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA IS INCORRECT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-62
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-247
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
247
GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
201013-i, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS OF THIS FAILURE
BE INCLUDED IN THE EFFECTS (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-63
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-248
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202112-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
248
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ z/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
PROP TANK ISOL VALVES. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE,
HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS. NASA/RI
DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF
THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-64
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-249
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
249
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ITEM LIST SHOULD NOT INCLUDE THE 3/4/5 VALVES. NASA/RI DO NOT
COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA WITHDRAWS I/i
ISSUE, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF PROP TO A
THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/IR PPP,
I/i ABORT FMEA AND CIL FOR RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE PROP TANK ISOL
1/2 VALVES. LOSS OF PROP FLOW THROUGH THE 1/2 VALVE WOULD RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF ONE +X THRUSTER USED TO DUMP ARCS PROP DURING RTLS
& TAL ABORTS. INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PLANNED ARCS DUMP COULD
RESULT IN VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL R_SOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-202110-I (3/IR
PPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS I/I ABORT ISSUE (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-251 FOR
RATIONALE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-65
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-251
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
251
PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS PROP TANK ISOL 1/2 VALVE FAILURE BE
UPGRADED TO A 3/IR PPP, i/i ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF
FLOW THROUGH THE 1/2 VALVE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE +X
THRUSTER USED TO DUMP ARCS PROP DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS.
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PLANNED ARCS DUMP COULD RESULT IN
VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A i/i ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF ONE +X THRUSTER TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE PLANNED ENTRY X CG
OF THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG LIMIT (1109.0
INCHES) SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS PROP REMAINING IN THE
TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS VALVE FAILURE, CAUSES
THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT LIMIT IS BASED ON
ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA ESTIMATES THIS FAILURE COULD
MOVE THE X CG AFT BY A MAXIMUM OF LESS THAN 1 INCH. IOA STILL
RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND
FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN
PRE-FLIGHT CG PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO
REQUIRED FOR A i/i ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-66
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-254
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
254
MANIFOLD 1/2 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-67
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-256
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
256
MANIFOLD 3/4/5 GROUND PURGE COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-68
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-258
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
258
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW).
IOA WITHDRAWS i/i CRIT ISSUE, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT
RESTRICTED FLOW OF PROP TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-
THROUGH.
FINAL RESOLUTION: S. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-202111-2 (2/2, i/I
ABORT, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-259
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
259
RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
CROSSFEED VALVES. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE,
HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS. NASA/RI
DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF
THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, I/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-70
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-267
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
267
MANIFOLD I, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PPP, i/i ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE OMS OR
ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL, RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS OR OMS PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A i/I ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF THREE PRIMARY THRUSTERS TO CAUSE
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE
PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG
LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES) SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS
PROP REMAINING IN THE TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS
VALVE FAILURE, CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT
LIMIT IS BASED ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL
RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND
FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN
PRE-FLIGHT CG PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO
REQUIRED FOR A i/i ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-71
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-268
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
268
MANIFOLD i, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-72
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-271
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
271
MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PPP, i/i ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE OMS OR
ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL, RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS OR OMS PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A I/i ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF THREE PRIMARY THRUSTERS TO CAUSE
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE
PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG
LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES) SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS
PROP REMAINING IN THE TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS
VALVE FAILURE, CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT
LIMIT IS BASED ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL
RECOMMENDS A i/I ABORT CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND
FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCS BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN
PRE-FLIGHT CG PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO
REQUIRED FOR A I/i ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-73
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-272
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
272
MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-74
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-275
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
275
MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PPP, i/i ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE OMS OR
ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL, RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS OR OMS PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A i/I ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF THREE PRIMARY THRUSTERS TO CAUSE
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE
PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG
LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES) SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS
PROP REMAINING IN THE TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS
VALVE FAILURE, CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT
LIMIT IS BASED ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL
RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND
FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN
PRE-FLIGHT CG PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO
REQUIRED FOR A i/i ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-75
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-276
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
276
MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-76
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-279
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
279
MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS -
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PPP, i/I ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE OMS OR
ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL, RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS OR OMS PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
F;NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A I/i ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF THREE PRIMARY THRUSTERS TO CAUSE
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE
PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG
LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES) SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS
PROP REMAINING IN THE TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS
VALVE FAILURE, CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT
LIMIT IS BASED ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL
RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND
FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN
PRE-FLIGHT CG PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO
REQUIRED FOR A i/I ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-77
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-280
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
280
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-78
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-284
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
284
MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-79
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-286
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 286
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
PRIMARY MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVES. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAD RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-80
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-286A
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202140-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDACID: 286
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINA_ RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, I/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-81
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-287
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 287
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS i/i CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF
PROP TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-202140-I (2/2,
FAILS CLOSED, VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE) AND 03-2A-202120-3
(3/IR PPP, FAILS CLOSED, PRIMARY MANIFOLD ISOL VALVES) DURING THE
NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT ISSUE ON THE
PRIMARY MANIFOLD ISOL VALVES (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEETS RCS-267, 271,
275, & 279 FOR RATIONALE).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-82
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-290
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARCS
290
THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOIDVLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS ON".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED OPEN MODE BE UPGRADED TO A i/i
BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206, ANY SINGLE
FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS A i/I.
PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITY, BUT RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEETS RCS-293, 295, & 297. THE SSM STATES THAT THE WORST-CASE
EFFECT OF ZOTS RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THRUSTER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE. ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER HOUSING.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-83
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-291
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
291
THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOIDVLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-84
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-292
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
292
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS I/i CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF
PROP COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE
RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-221310-4 (3/IR
FPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS I/I ABORT ISSUE (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEETS RCS-293, 295,
& 297 FOR RATIONALE).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-85
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-293
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
293
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR FPP,
I/i ABORT. THE LOSS OF ONE PRIMARY THRUSTER DURING AN RTLS OR TAL
ABORT WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPING CAPABILITY.
INABILITY TO COMPLETE PLANNED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPS COULD RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND OMS PROP
TANK LANDING WT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A i/1 ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF ONE THRUSTER TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF
THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES)
SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS PROP REMAINING IN THE
TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS THRUSTER FAILURE,
CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT LIMIT IS BASED
ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS A I/I ABORT
CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND FURTHER RECOMMENDS
THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN PRE-FLIGHT CG
PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO REQUIRED FOR
A I/i ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-86
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-294
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
294
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN THE LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS
22206, A SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A i/i. PROP LEAKAGE IS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND
CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A I/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITY, BUT RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEET RCS-293. THE SSM STATES THAT THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS
RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER HOUSING.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-87
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-295
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
295
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR FPP,
I/I ABORT. THE LOSS OF ONE PRIMARY THRUSTER DURING AN RTLS OR TAL
ABORT WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPING CAPABILITY.
INABILITY TO COMPLETE PLANNED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPS COULD RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND OMS PROP
TANK LANDING WT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A i/I ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF ONE THRUSTER TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF
THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES)
SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS PROP REMAINING IN THE
TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS THRUSTER FAILURE,
CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT LIMIT IS BASED
ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT
CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND FURTHER RECOMMENDS
THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN PRE-FLIGHT CG
PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO REQUIRED FOR
A 1/1 ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-296
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
296
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN THE LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS
22206, A SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A I/i. PROP LEAKAGE IS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND
CREW.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITY, BUT RECOMMENDS A i/I ABORT CRIT. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEET RCS-295. THE SSM STATES THAT THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS
RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER HOUSING.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-89
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-297
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
297
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR FPP,
i/i ABORT. THE LOSS OF ONE PRIMARY THRUSTER DURING AN RTLS OR TAL
ABORT WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPING CAPABILITY.
INABILITY TO COMPLETE PLANNED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPS COULD RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND OMS PROP
TANK LANDING WT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS 1/1 ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A 1/1 ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF ONE THRUSTER TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF
THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES)
SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS PROP REMAINING IN THE
TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS THRUSTER FAILURE,
CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT LIMIT IS BASED
ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS A i/I ABORT
CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND FURTHER RECOMMENDS
THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN PRE-FLIGHT CG
PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO REQUIRED FOR
A 1/1 ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-90
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-298
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
298
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A I/I BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN THE LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS
22206, A SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A I/i. PROP LEAKAGE IS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND
CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITY, BUT RECOMMENDS A i/I ABORT CRIT. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEET RCS-297. THE SSM STATES THAT THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS
RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER HOUSING.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-91
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-301
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-231310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
301
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS ON".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED OPEN MODE BE UPGRADED TO A i/i
BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206, ANY SINGLE
FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS A i/i.
PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE
SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/I PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF VERNIERS STANDPOINT, IOA RECOMMENDS A CRIT 2/2. HOWEVER,
IOA ACCEPTS NASA IR CRIT SINCE IT IS ON THE CIL. THE NASA CRITS
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE ARE INCONSISTENT BETWEEN THE FORWARD
AND AFT RCS SYSTEMS.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-92
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-303
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
303
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESODUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-304
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-231310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
304
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/I BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A i/i. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW. IOA
ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA
BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
_INAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS 1/1 ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/I PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF VERNIERS STANDPOINT, IOA RECOMMENDS A CRIT 2/2. HOWEVER,
IOA ACCEPTS NASA IR CRIT SINCE IT IS ON THE CIL. THE NASA CRITS
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE ARE INCONSISTENT BETWEEN THE FORWARD
AND AFT RCS SYSTEMS.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-94
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10002X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 10002
ITEM: HE ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ N ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL AS A 2/IR PFF. INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND
SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP COULD RESULT IN
VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF FLOW
THROUGH ONE VALVE NOT DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG OPERATION.
CONTAMINATION CAN EFFECT BOTH VALVES.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-I01020-4 (3/IR
PPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS 2/IR ISSUE (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-104 FOR RATIONALE).
IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS B AND C SCREEN ISSUES. THIS FAILURE WOULD BE
DETECTABLE BEFORE LAUNCH AND ON-ORBIT SINCE ONLY ONE VALVE IS OPEN
AT A TIME DURING PAD PRE-PRESS AND ON-ORBIT. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES WHEN BOTH VALVES
ARE USED SIMULTANEOUSLY (ASCENT AND ENTRY), WHEN THIS FAILURE
WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE. IOA ACCEPTS C SCREEN PASSAGE BASED ON
THE QUESTIONABLE CREDIBILITY OF AN AMOUNT OF CONTAMINATION
SUFFICIENT TO BLOCK BOTH VALVES. HOWEVER, ANY UPSTREAM
CONTAMINATION COULD AFFECT ALL REDUNDANCY, AND IOA RECOMMENDS
FAILURE OF THE C SCREEN.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-95
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10003X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 10003
ITEM: HE ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C. 18-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10005X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01095-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10005
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE (SINGLE INLET FILTER
BLOCKAGE), BUT ADDED CIL PER IOA ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS CRIT I/I.
INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND DEPLETE PROP COULD RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, AND MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA ISSUE AND INCONSISTENCY
BETWEEN RCS HDW CRIT AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I. SSM STATED THAT
USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG MANAGEMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN
RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN IOA AND GN&C CRITS. A POST-
DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN).
THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP IS NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE OF A BLOCKED
CHECK VLV FILTER, THE X CG LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED RESULTING IN LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD
REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY
WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON PARTIAL ULLAGE CAPABILITY, THE
"CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, IOA
STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A i/i FOR THIS FAILURE MODE, OR A
FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET THE
ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS CRIT
AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-97
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10006X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10006
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE BE INCLUDED
ON THIS CIL (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND
GROUND CREWS).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-98
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RCS-10008X
NONE
FRCS
10008
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ NA]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-I01060-3 (3/IR
FNP, BURST DISK FAILS TO BURST) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE
ACTIVITY.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-99
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10009X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01060-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10009
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE. IOA HAS
NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND ADDING
STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND THE HAZARDS OF PROP LEAKAGE TO
EVA CREW, VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE
HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I00
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-10OI0X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
I0010
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE
FAILS CLOSED) BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PNP AND PLACED ON THE CIL.
THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF
DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES. IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR
PNP SINCE A PREVIOUS FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WILL BE
CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) STATED ON 5/19/88 THAT THIS
3/3 FMEA WAS DELETED, AND THE FAILURE MODE LISTED AS A CAUSE ON
THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-I02108-I, i/i). IOA
ACCEPTS THIS AS ADEQUATE AND WITHDRAWS ISSUE, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDIVIDUALLY ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO
ENSURE THAT IT RECEIVES PROPER ATTENTION (SUCH AS 03-2A-202140-3,
I/i, WHICH ADDRESSES "INTERNAL RELIEF SECTION OF VALVE FAILS
CLOSED" AS A FAILURE MODE FOR THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION
VALVE).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I01
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10012X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10012
MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE
FAILS CLOSED) BE UPGRADED TO A I/i AND PLACED ON THE CIL. THIS
FAILURE COULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF
DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) STATED ON 5/19/88 THAT THIS
3/3 FMEA WAS DELETED, AND THE FAILURE MODE LISTED AS A CAUSE ON
THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-I02108-I, i/I). IOA
ACCEPTS THIS AS ADEQUATE AND WITHDRAWS ISSUE, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDIVIDUALLY ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO
ENSURE THAT IT RECEIVES PROPER ATTENTION (SUCH AS 03-2A-202140-3,
i/i, WHICH ADDRESSES "INTERNAL RELIEF SECTION OF VALVE FAILS
CLOSED" AS A FAILURE MODE FOR THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION
VALVE).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I02
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10014X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
i0014
MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE FAILS TO
RELIEVE). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A 2/IR PNP CIL BE CREATED FOR THIS
ITEM AND FAILURE MODE. THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES. IOA NOW
CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR PNP SINCE A PREVIOUS FAILURE IS
REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WOULD BE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THIS FAILURE MODE IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-i, I/i). IOA ACCEPTS THIS AS ADEQUATE, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDIVIDUALLY ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO
ENSURE THAT IT RECEIVES PROPER ATTENTION (SUCH AS 03-2A-202140-3,
WHICH ADDRESSES "INTERNAL RELIEF SECTION OF VALVE FAILS CLOSED" AS
A FAILURE MODE FOR THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10018X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10018
THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSEMBLY, PRIMARY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW),
HOWEVER, NOTE ON 03-2F-121312-I SAYS THAT THE INJECTOR FMEA WAS
DELETED AND ADDED AS A CAUSE ON 03-2F-121312-I. IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDEPENDENTLY ON THE
CIL WITH A I/i CRITICALITY. THE INJECTOR IS AT THE SAME LEVEL OF
DETAIL WITH OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS COVERED ON INDIVIDUAL FMEAS,
AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE I/i ATTENTION. RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE
INJECTOR COULD RESULT IN THRUSTER BURN-THROUGH.
FINA_ RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE
INJECTOR HEAD ASSEMBLY IS ADEQUATELY COVERED ON 03-2F-121312-I
(1/1) WHICH INCLUDES "BLOCKED INJ ORIFICES" AS A CAUSE FOR THRUST
CHAMBER BURN-THROUGH. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON A SEPARATE i/i CIL TO ENSURE THAT
THEY RECEIVE PROPER ATTENTION. IOA CONSIDERS THIS ITEM TO BE AT
THE SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS ADDRESSED
INDIVIDUALLY ON FMEAS.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-104
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10019X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10019
THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSEMBLY, PRIMARY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, BURN-THROUGH), HOWEVER, NOTE ON 03-2F-121312-I SAYS THAT
THE INJECTOR FMEA WAS DELETED AND ADDED AS A CAUSE ON 03-2F-
121312-1. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE
ADDRESSED INDEPENDENTLY ON THE CIL WITH A I/1 CRITICALITY. THE
INJECTOR IS AT THE SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL WITH OTHER THRUSTER
COMPONENTS COVERED ON INDIVIDUAL FMEAS, AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE
I/i ATTENTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. STRUCTURAL FAILURE/BURN-
THROUGH OF THE INJECTOR ASSEMBLY IS COVERED ON 03-2F-121312-I
(I/i) WHICH INCLUDES "INJECTOR FRACTURE" AS A CAUSE FOR THRUST
CHAMBER BURN-THROUGH. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON A SEPARATE i/I CIL TO ENSURE THAT
THEY RECEIVE PROPER ATTENTION. IOA CONSIDERS THIS ITEM TO BE AT
THE SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS ADDRESSED
INDIVIDUALLY ON FMEAS.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10020X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 10020
ITEM: HE ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL AS A 2/IR PFF. INABILITY TO REPRESS ARCS PROP TANK AND
INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE ARCS PROP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
ENTRY CONTROL AND VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE VALVE NOT DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG
OPERATION, AND CONTAMINATION CAN AFFECT BOTH VALVES
S IMULTANEOUS LY.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-201020-I (2/IR
PPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS B AND C SCREEN ISSUES. THIS FAILURE WOULD BE DETECTABLE
BEFORE LAUNCH AND ON ORBIT SINCE ONLY ONE VALVE IS OPEN AT A TIME
DURING PAD PRE-PRESS AND ON ORBIT. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES WHEN BOTH VALVES ARE USED
SIMULTANEOUSLY (ASCENT AND ENTRY), WHEN THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE
DETECTABLE. IOA ACCEPTS C SCREEN PASSAGE BASED ON THE QUESTIONABLE
CREDIBILITY OF AN AMOUNT OF CONTAMINATION SUFFICIENT TO BLOCK BOTH
VALVES. HOWEVER, ANY UPSTREAM CONTAMINATION COULD AFFECT ALL
REDUNDANCY, AND IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF THE C SCREEN.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I06
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10021X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 10021
ITEM: HE ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A--
201013-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-i07
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10024X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10024
QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
201013-1, I/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE BE INCLUDED
ON THE FMEA (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND
GROUND CREWS).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I08
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10026X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10026
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-201060-3 (3/IR
FNP, BURST DISK FAILS TO RUPTURE) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE
ACTIVITY.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
RCS-10027X
03-2A-201060-I
ARCS
10027
PRESSURE RELIEF ASSEMBLY
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE. IOA HAS
NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND ADDING
STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND THE HAZARDS OF PROP LEAKAGE TO EVA
CREW, VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS
FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
201013-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-II0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-10028X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10028
PROPTANK ISOL VLVS 3/4/5
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES C SCREEN AS "PASS". NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS
FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/IR PFP FOR
RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE PROP TANK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES. RESTRICTED
FLOW THROUGH ONE 3/4/5 VALVE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL
LEG OPERATION. IOA WITHDRAWS 2/IR CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN
THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF PROP TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-
THROUGH.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-202110-I (3/IR
PPP, FAILS CLOSED), AND TO UPGRADE THE B SCREEN TO "FAIL" DURING
THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-III
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-10029X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202110-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ARCS
10029
PROPTANK ISOL VLV 1/2
C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED)
BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PNP FOR THE 1/2 VALVE AND PLACED ON THE CIL.
THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE
DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES. IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR
PNP SINCE A PREVIOUS FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WOULD BE
CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THIS FAILURE MODE IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/I). IOA ACCEPTS THIS AS ADEQUATE, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDIVIDUALLY ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO
ENSURE THAT IT RECEIVES PROPER ATTENTION (SUCH AS 03-2A-202140-3,
WHICH ADDRESSES "INTERNAL RELIEF SECTION OF VALVE FAILS CLOSED" AS
A FAILURE MODE FOR THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10035X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10035
MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOL VALVES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED)
BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PNP AND PLACED ON THE CIL. THIS FAILURE
COULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE DOWNSTREAM
PROP LINES. IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR PNP SINCE A
PREVIOUS FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WOULD BE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THIS FAILURE MODE IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/i). IOA ACCEPTS THIS AS ADEQUATE, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDIVIDUALLY ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO
ENSURE THAT IT RECEIVES PROPER ATTENTION (SUCH AS 03-2A-202140-3,
WHICH ADDRESSES "INTERNAL RELIEF SECTION OF VALVE FAILS CLOSED" AS
A FAILURE MODE FOR THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: RCS-10040X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10040
THRUSTERINJECTOR HEADASSY, PRIMARY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM AND FAILURE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL WITH A I/i CRITICALITY. THE INJECTOR IS AT THE SAME
LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS WHICH ARE COVERED ON
INDIVIDUAL FMEA, AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE I/i ATTENTION.
RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE INJECTOR COULD RESULT IN THRUSTER BURN-
THROUGH.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE
INJECTOR ASSEMBLY IS COVERED ON 03-2A-221312-I (i/I) WHICH
INCLUDES "BLOCKED INJ ORIFICES" AS A CAUSE FOR THRUST CHAMBER
BURN-THROUGH. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE
MODE BE ADDRESSED ON A SEPARATE I/i CIL TO ENSURE THAT THEY
RECEIVE PROPER ATTENTION. IOA CONSIDERS THIS ITEM TO BE AT THE
SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS ADDRESSED
INDIVIDUALLY ON FMEAS.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10041X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
i0041
THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSY, PRIMARY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM AND FAILURE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
BURN-THROUGH). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE
ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL WITH A i/i CRITICALITY. THE INJECTOR IS
AT THE SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS WHICH ARE
COVERED ON INDIVIDUAL FMEA, AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE I/i ATTENTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. STRUCTURAL FAILURE/BURN-
THROUGH OF THE INJECTOR ASSEMBLY IS COVERED ON 03-2A-221312-I
(i/I) WHICH INCLUDES "INJECTOR FRACTURE" AS A CAUSE FOR THRUST
CHAMBER BURN-THROUGH. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON A SEPARATE i/i CIL TO ENSURE THAT
THEY RECEIVE PROPER ATTENTION. IOA CONSIDERS THIS ITEM TO BE AT
THE SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS ADDRESSED
INDIVIDUALLY ON FMEAS.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10042X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10042
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED OPERATION, ONE
VALVE OPENS SLOWLY OR LATE). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL WITH A I/i CRIT. SUCH A
FAILURE COULD RESULT IN ZOTS CAUSING THRUSTER RUPTURE AND LEAKAGE
OF PROP.
F_NAL RESQLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST CASES OF THE
IOA FAILURE MODE ARE EITHER "FAILS CLOSED" OR "INTERNAL LEAKAGE".
THEREFORE, IOA NO LONGER RECOMMENDS THAT THIS "LESS THAN WORST
CASE" FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED. THE FMEA/CIL NEED ONLY ADDRESS
THE WORST-CASE. IOA'S ZOTS CONCERNS ARE NOW TRANSFERRED TO THE
ISSUE ON THE THRUSTER "INTERNAL LEAKAGE" CIL (03-2F-121310-2 VS.
RCS-181, 185, 187,& 189).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10043X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10043
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED OPERATION, ONE
VALVE OPENS SLOWLY OR LATE). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL WITH A i/i CRIT. SUCH A
FAILURE COULD RESULT IN ZOTS CAUSING THRUSTER RUPTURE AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST CASES OF THE
IOA FAILURE MODE ARE EITHER "FAILS CLOSED" OR "INTERNAL LEAKAGE".
THEREFORE, IOA NO LONGER RECOMMENDS THAT THIS "LESS THAN WORST
CASE" FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED. THE FMEA/CIL NEED ONLY ADDRESS
THE WORST-CASE. IOA'S ZOTS CONCERNS ARE NOW TRANSFERRED TO THE
ISSUE ON THE THRUSTER "INTERNAL LEAKAGE" CIL (03-2A-221310-i VS.
RCS-290, 294, 296, & 298).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10116X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
10116
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (PREMATURE
OPERATION DURING GROUND C/O TRICKLE CURRENT TEST) BE UPGRADED TO A
i/I AND PLACED ON THE CIL. FIRING OF A THRUSTER ON THE GROUND
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP, PROP
VAPORS, OR THRUSTER PLUME.
FINA_ REs0_UTION: IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88. SSM IS NOT CONCERNED THAT THE RCS
FMEA/CIL COVER FAILURES WHICH AFFECT ONLY GROUND TURNAROUND PHASES
AND, THEREFORE, DOES NOT AGREE WITH A CRIT 1/1 UPGRADE FOR THIS
FAILURE. SSM IS ONLY CONCERNED THAT THE RCS FMEA/CIL SHOULD COVER
FAILURES WHICH AFFECT MISSION, CREW, AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT
PHASES. IOA WILL ACCEPT SSM'S PHILOSOPHY. HOWEVER, PER IOA'S
INTERPRETATION, NSTS 22206 WOULD REQUIRE THAT THIS FAILURE BE
CLASSIFIED AS A 1/1. THIS TEST IS PERFORMED DURING OPS-9, WHICH
OVERLAPS THE IOA DEFINITION OF THE PRE-LAUNCH PHASE. THEREFORE,
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE, WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
LIFE ON THE GROUND, BE CLASSIFIED AS A 1/1.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-i18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: RCS-10138X
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
10138
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (PREMATURE
OPERATION DURING GROUND C/O TRICKLE CURRENT TEST) BE UPGRADED TO A
I/i AND PLACED ON THE CIL. FIRING OF A THRUSTER ON THE GROUND
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP, PROP
VAPORS, OR THRUSTER PLUME.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88. SSM IS NOT CONCERNED THAT THE RCS
FMEA/CIL COVER FAILURES WHICH AFFECT ONLY GROUND TURNAROUND PHASES
AND, THEREFORE, DOES NOT AGREE WITH A CRIT I/I UPGRADE FOR THIS
FAILURE. SSM IS ONLY CONCERNED THAT THE RCS FMEA/CIL SHOULD COVER
FAILURES WHICH AFFECT MISSION, CREW, AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT
PHASES. IOA WILL ACCEPT SSM'S PHILOSOPHY. HOWEVER, PER IOA'S
INTERPRETATION, NSTS 22206 WOULD REQUIRE THAT THIS FAILURE BE
CLASSIFIED AS A i/i. THIS TEST IS PERFORMED DURING OPS-9, WHICH
OVERLAPS THE IOA DEFINITION OF THE PRE-LAUNCH PHASE. THEREFORE,
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE, WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
LIFE ON THE GROUND, BE CLASSIFIED AS A I/I.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.18-I19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-321
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 321
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. DIODE FAILING SHORT ALONE
HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-120
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-323
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 323
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. DIODE FAILING SHORT ALONE
HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-121
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-388
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 388
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-122
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-406
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDACID: 406
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-123
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-410
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 410
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-124
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-420
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 420
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-125
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-424
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 424
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-126
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-442
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 442
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-127
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-446
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 446
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-128
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-456
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-472
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 472
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
WITH THE LOSS OF THIS RELAY, VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. INABILITY
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION OF JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-130
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-473
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 473
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-131
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-475
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 475
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-132
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-477
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 477
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAVUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-133
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-478
05-6KF-2126 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 478
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH THE LOSS OF THIS RELAY, VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. INABILITY
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION OF JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-479
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDACID: 479
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-135
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-481
05-6KF-2126A-2
FRCS
481
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-483
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 483
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-137
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-484
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 484
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
WITH THE LOSS OF THIS RELAY, VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. INABILITY
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING CG LIMITS. ALSO THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 5 (VERNIERS - 2/2). IOA ORIGINALLY
FAILED THIS B SCREEN SINCE CREW CANNOT DETECT FAILURE (EXCEPT VIA
MCA STATUS) UNTIL AFTER CLOSING THE VALVE, WHICH IS TOO LATE TO
RECOVER BY NOT CLOSING THE VALVE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN, AND SINCE ANOTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE
CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE. ALSO, NSTS 22206
(2.3.4.B.2.B) SAYS THAT AN ITEM NOT USED DURING ANY NOMINAL
MISSION PHASE SHOULD HAVE AN "NA" B SCREEN. THIS ITEM IS SINCE
THE VALVE IS NOT NOMINALLY CLOSED. SO IOA CONCURS WITH A "PASS"
B SCREEN, SINCE "P" AND "NA" ARE NON-CILS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-138
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-485
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 485
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-139
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-487
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 487
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-140
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-489
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 489
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PTROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-141
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-490
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 490
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
WITH THE LOSS OF THIS RELAY, VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. INABILITY
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING CG LIMITS. ALSO THEIR IS NO
REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 5 (VERNIERS - 2/2).
IOA ORIGINALLY FAILED THIS B SCREEN SINCE CREW CANNOT DETECT
FAILURE (EXCEPT VIA MCA STATUS) UNTIL AFTER CLOSING THE VALVE,
WHICH IS TOO LATE TO RECOVER BY NOT CLOSING THE VALVE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN, AND SINCE ANOTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE
CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE. ALSO, NSTS 22206
(2.3.4.B.2.B) SAYS THAT AN ITEM NOT USED DURING ANY NOMINAL
MISSION PHASE SHOULD HAVE AN "NA" B SCREEN. THIS ITEM IS SINCE
THE VALVE IS NOT NOMINALLY CLOSED. SO IOA CONCURS WITH A "PASS"
B SCREEN, SINCE "P" AND "NA" ARE NON-CILS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-142
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-491
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 491
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
I0A [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-493
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 493
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-495
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 495
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-145
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-496
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2083 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 496
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-498
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2083 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDACID: 498
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-500
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2083 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 500
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-514
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 514
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-516
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 516
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-518
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 518
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-568
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 568
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-569
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 569
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-572
05-6KF-2255 -i
FRCS
572
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-576
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 576
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-577
05-6KF-2255E-2
FRCS
577
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-578
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 578
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-581
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDACID: 581
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-583
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 583
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-590
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDACID: 590
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-591
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 591
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-594
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 594
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-598
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 598
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-163
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-599
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 599
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-164
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-600
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 600
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-165
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-603
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 603
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-166
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-605
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 605
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-167
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-612
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 612
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-168
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-613
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 613
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-169
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-616
05-6KF-2255 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 616
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-170
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-620
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDACID: 620
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-171
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-621
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 621
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-172
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-622
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 622
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-173
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-625
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 625
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-174
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-627
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 627
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-175
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-634
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 634
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-176
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-635
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 635
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-177
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-638
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 638
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-178
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-642
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDACID: 642
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-179
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-643
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 643
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-180
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-644
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 644
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-181
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-647
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 647
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-182
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-649
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 649
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-183
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
FRCS-668
05-6KF-2208 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 668
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [p]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-184
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-669
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 669
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-185
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-670
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 670
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-186
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-672
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 672
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-673
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 673
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-674
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 674
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-189
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-676
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 676
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-190
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-677
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 677
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-678
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 678
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-680
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 680
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-681
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 681
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-682
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 682
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-702
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 702
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-196
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-703
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 703
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-705
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 705
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-706
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 706
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-707
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 707
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CiL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOALTION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-200
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-709
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 709
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-201
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-710
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 710
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-202
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-711
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 711
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-203
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-713
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 713
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-204
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-714
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 714
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-205
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-715
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 715
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-206
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-717
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 717
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-207
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-718
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 718
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-208
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-732
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 732
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-209
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-746
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 746
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-210
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-760
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 760
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-211
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-880
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
FRCS
880
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-212
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-881
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
881
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-213
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-882
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
882
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-214
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-883
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
883
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-215
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-885
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
885
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-216
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-886
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
886
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-217
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-887
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
887
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-218
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-889
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
889
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-219
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-890
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
890
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-220
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-891
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
891
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-221
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-894
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
894
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-222
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-901
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
901
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-223
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-902
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
902
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-224
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-904
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
904
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTRS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-225
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-906
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
906
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-226
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-908
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
908
CONTROLLER,REMOTEPOWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-227
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-909
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -1
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 909
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE
(FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-228
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-913
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 913
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3 JETS.
JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE
(FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-229
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-915
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 915
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE
(FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-230
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-919
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 919
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE
(FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-231
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-941
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 941
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4 AND 5.
PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2.
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 4 JETS
JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-232
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-943
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 943
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE
(FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-233
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-947
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 947
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-234
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-948
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 948
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-235
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-949
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 949
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-236
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-950
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 950
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [2/2] [ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-237
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-952
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 952
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-238
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-954
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 954
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-239
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-955
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 955
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-240
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-956
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 956
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-241
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-958
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2220 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 958
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-242
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-959
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 959
ITEM: FUSE, 2A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-243
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-960
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 960
ITEM: FUSE, IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. KARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-244
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-961
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 961
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELET_ }
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MA_rI_
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATIL_
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-245
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-962
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 962
ITEM: FUSE, 2A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-246
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-963
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 963
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-247
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS-964
05-6KF-2007 -I
FRCS
964
FUSE, IA
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-248
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-965
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 965
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-249
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-966
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 966
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
I. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-250
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-967
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 967
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
i. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-251
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-970
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 970
ITEM: FUSE, IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-252
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-972
05-6KF-2130 -i
FRCS
972
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
A B
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-253
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-974
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 974
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS OF MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-254
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-976
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 976
ITEM: RELAY, LATCHING
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-255
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II44
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
FRCS
1144
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L, F5R
D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VERNIER THRUSTERS CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121314-2 FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS ITEM IS
WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY AND SO IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II45
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1145
CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FSL, F5R
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VERNIER THRUSTERS CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121314-I FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS ITEM IS
WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY AND SO IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-257
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II54
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FSR
FRCS
1154
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VERNIER THRUSTERS INJECTOR TEMPERATURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121315-2 FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS ITEM IS
WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY AND SO IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II55
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
F5R
FRCS
1155
OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VERNIER THRUSTERS INJECTOR TEMPERATURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121315-I FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS ITEM IS
WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY AND SO IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1300
NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
1300
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OPERATONS. NOTE: VERNIER
THRUSTERS THERMAL SWITCH NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED ON THIS FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS ITEM IS
WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II005X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11005
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II007X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11007
MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II008X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2090 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11008
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STAUTS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II017X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2156 -I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: i1017
ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STAUTS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11019X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2177 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11019
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II020X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2178 -I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11020
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE TO
PERFORM MISSION OPERATIONS
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II021X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2178 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11021
CONTROLLER,REMOTEPOWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II022X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210A-1
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11022
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II024X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: I1024
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS
OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDNACY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II025X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11025
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS FOR MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II027X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2213 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11027
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-271
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II029X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2212 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11029
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER FAILED HIGH
CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS CAUSES LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II030X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2211 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11030
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE FOR VERNIERS,
THUS CAUSING LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II031X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2211 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11031
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II032X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2113A-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11032
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] .
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II033X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2113A-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11033
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II034X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2224 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11034
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-277
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II035X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2224 -2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11035
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-278
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II036X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11036
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II038X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11038
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II070X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11070
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE,
CAUSING LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
FRCS-11077X
05-6KF-2280 -2
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
FRCS
11077
CIRCUIT BREAKER
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II081X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11081
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS FURTHER
VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (HE PRESS ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II082X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11082
HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS FURTHER
VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (HE PRESS ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-I1096X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11096
MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-285
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II097X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11097
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-286
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III01X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
lll01
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III02X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11102
MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-288
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III06X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11106
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-289
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III07X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11107
MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C. 18-290
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIIIIX
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
iiiii
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN TH VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-291
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11112X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11112
MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN TH VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIII5X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11115
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIII9X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM'.
FRCS
11119
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III20X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11120
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-III24X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11124
RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III25X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11125
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-297
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III29X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11129
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-298
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-III30X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11130
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-299
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III34X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11134
RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-300
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IlI35X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11135
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-301
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-III39X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
FRCS
ii139
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 5
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-302
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III40X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
ii140
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-303
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II144X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
FRCS
ii144
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ IN/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-304
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-III50X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11150
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-305
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III54X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11154
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-306
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III96X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11196
SIGNAL CONDITIONER OF3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SIGNAL CONDITIONER NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS IS NOT A
DEDICATED SIGNAL CONDITIONER AND IS COVERED BY THE GN&C
SUBSYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-307
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
FRCS-II202X BASELINE [ ]
NONE NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11202
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THESE DIODES
ARE PART OF THE HELIUM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE AND ARE COVERED
BY THE VALVE'S FMEA, AND BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED HARDWARE CIL
ISSUE (HE PRESS ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-308
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II205X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11205
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THESE MICRO (OR
LIMIT) SWITCHES ARE PART OF A VALVE AND ARE CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE VALVE'S FMEA, AND BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED HARDWARE
CIL ISSUE (VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN FOR COMPLETENESS AND RECOMMENDS
THAT VALVE LIMIT OR MICROSWITCHES BE COVERED IN A SEPARATE FMEA.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-309
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II206X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11206
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THESE MICRO (OR
LIMIT) SWITCHES ARE PART OF A VALVE AND ARE CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE VALVE'S FMEA, AND BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED HARDWARE
CIL ISSUE (VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN FOR COMPLETENESS AND RECOMMENDS
THAT VALVE LIMIT OR MICROSWITCHES BE COVERED IN A SEPARATE FMEA.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-310
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II211X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252 -3
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11211
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY. B SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" BECAUSE
ISOLATION OF A LEAK IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF THE MULTIPLE
FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S
MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-311
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II212X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252 -3
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11212
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY. B SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" BECAUSE
ISOLATION OF A LEAK IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF THE MULTIPLE
FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-312
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-II213X
NONE
FRCS
11213
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-313
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II214X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11214
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-314
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II215X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11215
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-315
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-II216X
NONE
FRCS
11216
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II217X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11217
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II221X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDACID: 11221
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS THIUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-318
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1323
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1323
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-319
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1325
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1325
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-320
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1333
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1333
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-321
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1335
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1335
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-322
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1478
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1478
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-323
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1479
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1479
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-324
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1480
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1480
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VAVLE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-325
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1481
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1481
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-326
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1484
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1484
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-327
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1485
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1485
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-328
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1486
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1486
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR J [ P _ _ F _ _ P J _ X J *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VAVLE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-329
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1487
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1487
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-330
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1496
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1496
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-331
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1498
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1498
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-332
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1500
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1500
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-333
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1502
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-334
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1504
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-335
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1506
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1506
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-336
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1508
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-337
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1510
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-338
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1542
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1542
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEDD
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-339
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1544
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1544
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEDD
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-340
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1545
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1545
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE TANK ISOLATION 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT
DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS FAILURE
PREVENTS CROSSFEEDING TO MANIFOLDS 1 & 2, BUT NOT TO MANIFOLDS 3,
4, & 5.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-341
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1546
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1546
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-342
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS-1547
05-6KA-2126-i
ARCS
1547
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ P ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING
AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS FAILURE
PREVENTS CROSSFEEDING TO MANIFOLDS 1 & 2, BUT NOT TO MANIFOLDS 3,
4, & 5.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-343
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1548
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1548
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-344
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1550
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1550
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE 3/4/5 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-345
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1551
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1551
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
DISAGREE WITH BOTH.
OF A LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION
IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA HAD MISSED THE FACT
THAT NASA HAD ADDED A I/i ABORT TO THIS FMEA.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-346
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1552
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1552
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND LEG OF 3/4/5 AND CROSSFEED LEG. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-347
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1554
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1554
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE 3/4/5 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-348
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1555
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1555
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISAGREE WITH BOTH.
OF A LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION:
INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION
IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA HAD MISSED THE FACT
THAT NASA HAD ADDED A i/i ABORT TO THIS FMEA.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-349
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1556
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1556
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND LEG OF 3/4/5 AND CROSSFEED LEG. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-350
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS-1557
05-6KA-2133-I
ARCS
1557
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ P ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-351
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1558
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1558
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK. NOTE: NASA FMEA
INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIES RELAY 56V76AII6K44. IT SHOULD BE
56V76AII6K46.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-352
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1559
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1559
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-353
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1560
05-6KA-2133-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1560
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [p]
C ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-354
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1562
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1562
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-355
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1564
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1564
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-356
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1565
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1565
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-357
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1566
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1566
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-358
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1567
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1567
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-359
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1568
05-6KA-2133-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1568
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-360
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1570
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1570
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-361
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1572
05-6KA-2132-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1572
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMPARE [ /N ]
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] IN] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-362
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1574
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1574
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-363
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1576
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1576
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (i/i ABORT)
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IT WAS
DEPENDENT ON A HARDWA._E ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE FAILED
CLOSE), WHICH WAS WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-364
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS-1578
05-6KA-2128A-2
ARCS
1578
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-365
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1580
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1580
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (I/1 ABORT)
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IT WAS
DEPENDENT ON A HARDWARE ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE FAILED
CLOSE), WHICH WAS WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-366
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1582
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1582
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-367
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1584
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1584
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (i/i ABORT)
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IT WAS
DEPENDENT ON A HARDWARE ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE FAILED
CLOSE), WHICH WAS WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-368
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1586
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1586
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (I/i ABORT)
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IT WAS
DEPENDENT ON A HARDWARE ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE FAILED
CLOSE), WHICH WAS WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-369
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1588
05-6KA-2128A-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1588
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMPARE [ N / ]
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-370
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1589
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1589
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A I/I ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-371
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1591
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1591
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-372
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1593
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1593
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-373
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1595
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1595
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-374
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1599
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1599
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-375
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1603
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1603
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-376
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1604
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1604
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES, EXCEPT FOR NASA'S i/i ABORT CRITICALITY.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-377
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1605
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1605
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-378
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1607
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1607
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A I/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-379
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1609
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1609
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-380
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1611
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1611
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A I/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-381
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1619
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1619
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-382
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1621
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1621
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-383
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1623
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1623
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/I ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-384
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1624
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1624
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES, EXCEPT FOR NASA'S i/i ABORT CRITICALITY.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-385
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1625
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1625
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-386
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1627
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1627
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
] [x]*
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/I ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-387
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1631
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1631
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-388
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1633
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1633
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/I ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-389
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1635
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1635
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A I/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-390
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1637
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1637
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-391
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1643
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1643
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-392
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1645
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1645
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-393
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1649
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1649
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-394
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1661
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1661
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-395
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1663
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1663
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-396
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1667
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1667
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-397
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1683
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1683
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-398
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1697
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1697
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-399
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1711
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1711
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-400
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1725
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
ARCS
1725
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-401
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1858
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2154-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TALKBACK
ARCS
1858
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-402
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1859
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2155-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TALKBACK
ARCS
1859
MANIFOLD i, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-403
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1872
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1872
CONTROLLER,REMOTEPOWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-404
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1874
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1874
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-405
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1880
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1880
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-406
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1884
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1884
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-407
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1889
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1889
CONTROLLER, REMOTEPOWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-408
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1891
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1891
CONTROLLER, REMOTEPOWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-409
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: _CS-1896
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1896
CONTROLLER, REMOTEPOWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.!8-410
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1900
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1900
CONTROLLER, REMOTEPOWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-411
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1904
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1904
CONTROLLER,REMOTEPOWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
_ASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-412
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1906
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1906
CONTROLLER, REMOTEPOWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-413
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1980
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1980
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-414
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
1/29/88
ARCS-1982
05-6KA-2214-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1982
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
COMPARE [ /N ]
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] IN] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-415
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1984
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1984
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-416
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1986
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1986
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-417
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1988
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1988
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1990
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1990
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-419
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1992
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1992
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1994
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1994
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1996
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1996
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1998
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1998
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-2000
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2000
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2002
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2002
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
ARCS-2334 BASELINE [
NONE NEW [
ARCS
2334
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. IF JET IS REQUIRED, ORBITER ORIENT
ITSELF TOWARD SOLAR HEATING. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE INCORPORATED
INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE
THERMOSTATS ARE WITHIN THE PRIMARY THRUSTER ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT HARDWARE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA
MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THiS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2336
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
2336
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. IF JET IS REQUIRED, ORBITER ORIENT
ITSELF TOWARD SOLAR HEATING. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE INCORPORATED
INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE
THERMOSTATS ARE WITHIN THE PRIMARY THRUSTER ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT HARDWARE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA
MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
ARCS-2338 BASELINE [
NONE NEW [
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
2338
THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Z AXIS
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. IF JET IS REQUIRED, ORBITER ORIENT
ITSELF TOWARD SOLAR HEATING. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE INCORPORATED
INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE
THERMOSTATS ARE WITHIN THE PRIMARY THRUSTER ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT HARDWARE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA
MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-2340
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
2340
THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. THIS MAY
EFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE
INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE
THERMOSTATS ARE WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT HARDWARE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA
MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12004X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12004
MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12005X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12005
MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12006X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12006
MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12008X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12008
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12016X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2156-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12016
ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] IN] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS=I2019X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2177-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12019
CONTROLLER,REMOTEPOWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS
NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASAJS MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12020X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2178-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12020
CONTROLLER, REMOTEPOWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12021X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2178-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12021
CONTROLLER,REMOTEPOWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS
NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-437
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12022X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2210A-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12022
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-438
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12024X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12024
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ J [ ] [ ] [ J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-439
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12025X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2210-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12025
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE WHICH
CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-440
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12027X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2213-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12027
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-441
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12029X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2212-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12029
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-442
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12030X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2211-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12030
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-443
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12031X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2211-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12031
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-444
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12032X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2213A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12032
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-445
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12033X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2213A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12033
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-446
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12034X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2224-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12034
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ J [ ] [ J [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-447
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12035X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2224-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12035
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-448
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-12036X
05-6KA-2257-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12036
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-449
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12037X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12037
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REEDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, THE VALVE WILL NOT NEED TO BE OPENED AFTER A LEAK, ANYWAY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-450
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-12038X
05-6KA-2257A-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12038
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-451
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12052X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2258-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12052
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILTY TO OPEN THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS VERNIER
OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-452
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12072X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2280-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12072
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILTY TO OPEN THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS VERNIER
OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-453
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-12073X
05-6KA-2280-2
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS
12073
CIRCUIT BREAKER
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-454
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12082X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12082
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-455
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12083X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12083
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-456
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12084X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12084
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-457
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12086X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12086
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-458
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12088X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
12088
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-459
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12098X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12098
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-460
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12099X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12099
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE THUS PREVENTING CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-461
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12100X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12100
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-462
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12101X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12101
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-463
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12103X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12103
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-464
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12104X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12104
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-465
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12105X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12105
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-466
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS-12107X
05-6KA-2254-I
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12107
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] C ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-467
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12109X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12109
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-468
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS-12119X
05-6KA-2254E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12119
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-469
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12120X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12120
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE THUS PREVENTING CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE AN INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-470
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12121X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12121
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-471
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12122X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12122
DIODE - MANUALCLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
VALVE TO CLOSE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-472
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12126X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12126
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEEDVLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
C ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
I/i ABORT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-473
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12127X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12127
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOmmENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
i/i ABORT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-474
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
1/29/88
ARCS-12130X
05-6KA-2261-i
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12130
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-475
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12132X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12132
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION P_TIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-476
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12142X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12142
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-477
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12143X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12143
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-478
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12144X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12144
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-479
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12145X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12145
DIODE - MANUALCLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-480
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12147X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
12147
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
i/i ABORT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-481
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12148X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12148
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEEDVLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
i/i ABORT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-482
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12151X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12151
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-483
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12153X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12153
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988
C. 18-484 _ _
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12163X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12163
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IX ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-485
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12164X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12164
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-486
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12165X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261F-I
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12165
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-487
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12166X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12166
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-488
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS-12192X
05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12192
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] C ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-489
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12194X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
12194
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-490
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12204X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12204
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-491
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12205X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12205
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-492
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12206X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12206
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-493
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-12207X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12207
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-494
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12208X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12208
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-495
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12210X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12210
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-496
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12220X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS
12220
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-497
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12221X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12221
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-498
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12222X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12222
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-499
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12223X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12223
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONS
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-500
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS-12224X
05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12224
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-501
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12226X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12226
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-502
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12236X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12236
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-503
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12237X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12237
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-504
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12238X
NASA FMEA _: 05-6KA-2255F-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS
12238
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-505
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12239X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12239
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONS
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-506
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12240X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12240
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-507
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12242X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12242
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-508
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12252X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12252
DIODE - MANUALOPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-509
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12253X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12253
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-510
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12254X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12254
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-511
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-12255X
05-6KA-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12255
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P _ [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONS
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-512
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12256X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12256
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-513
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12260X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12260
RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2)..
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-514
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12276X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12276
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2)..
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-515
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12280X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
12280
RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2)..
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-516
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12329X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12329
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILED OPEN DIODE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF THIS CAUSES
INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE DIODES
ARE WITHIN THE HELIUM PRESSURE ISO VALVE ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT HARDWARE VALVE'S FMEA. IOA
MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-517
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-12332X BASELINE [ ]
NONE NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12332
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOmmENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE MICROSWITCH FAILURE ACROSS THE CLOSE CONTACTS WILL NOT ALLOW
THE VALVE TO BE CLOSED. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS
LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE (LIMIT)
MICROSWITCHES ARE WITHIN THE TANK ISO VALVE 1/2 ASSEMBLY, AND SO
IS CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT VALVE'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS
A CONCERN THAT THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-518
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-12344X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2258-3
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 12344
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
C ] C ] [ ]
IN] IN] [_]
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILTY TO OPEN THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS VERNIER
OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.18-519

SECTION C.19
COMMUNICATIONSAND TRACKING
SUBSYSTEM
C. 19-1
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-1045
NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21500-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM& TRACK
1045
NETWORKSIGNAL PROCESSOR,DL SECTION
A.W. ADDIS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ACTIVE NSP DOWNLINK COULD CAUSE MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT
BECAUSE ONLY ONE NSP PATH WOULD REMAIN FOR INSIGHT INTO VEHICLE
SYSTEMS VIA TELEMETRY. IOA ACCEPTS NASA FMEA CRITICALITY BASED
ON ACCOMPLISHING FM DOWNLINK OF TELEMETRY DATA THROUGH USE OF
A CABLE KIT WHICH ALLOWS USE OF THE FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR AND FM
TRANSMITTER FOR DOWNLINKING DATA AFTER FAILURE OF SECOND NSP.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.!9-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-1046
05-2G-21500-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM& TRACK
1046
NETWORKSIGNAL PROCESSOR,DL SECTION
A.W. ADDIS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ACTIVE NSP DOWNLINK COULD CAUSE MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT
BECAUSE ONLY ONE NSP PATH WOULD REMAIN FOR INSIGHT INTO VEHICLE
SYSTEMS VIA TELEMETRY. IOA ACCEPTS NASA FMEA CRITICALITY BASED
ON ACCOMPLISHING FM DO_4LINK OF TELEMETRY DATA THROUGH USE OF
A CABLE KIT WHICH ALLOWS USE OF THE FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR AND FM
TRANSMITTER FOR DOWNLINKING DATA AFTER FAILURE OF SECOND NSP.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-1051
NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21801-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM& TRACK
1051
NSP ENCRYPTION MODESWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMarKS:
SAME FAILURE MODES (e.g., FAIL MID-TRAVEL) COULD PREVENT
SELECTION OF "NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT" FUNCTIONS FOR SELECTION OF
"T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NO
HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE SWITCH'S FUNCTION.
IOA CRITICALITY AGREES WITH NASA FMEA/CIL 05-2G-21801-2 (CRIT-
2/2) FOR COMPLETE SWITCH FAILURE. SWITCH HAS DUAL SET OF
CONTACTS THAT MUST BE INVOLVED IN THE FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-1052
NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21801-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM & TRACK
1052
NSP ENCRYPTION MODE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SAME FAILURE MODES COULD PREVENT PROPER SELECTION OF "NSP
ENCRYPTION SELECT" FUNCTIONS "T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION
OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NOT HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE
SWITCH'S FUNCTION. RECOMMEND FMEA UPGRADE TO 2/2 (CIL STATUS).
AFTER NASA FMEA/CIL REEVALUATION, NASA REASSIGNED CRITICALITY
FROM 2/IR TO 2/2. IOA AND NASA NOW AGREE.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-1053
NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21802-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM & TRACK
1053
NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SAME FAILURE MODES (e.g., FAIL MID-TRAVEL) COULD PREVENT
SELECTION OF "NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT" FUNCTIONS FOR SELECTION OF
"T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NO
HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE SWITCH'S FUNCTION.
IOA CRITICALITY AGREES WITH NASA FMEA/CIL 05-2G-21802-2 (CRIT-
2/2) FOR COMPLETE SWITCH FAILURE. SWITCH HAS DUAL SET OF
CONTACTS THAT MUST BE INVOLVED IN THE FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-1054
NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21802-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM & TRACK
1054
NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SAME FAILURE MODES COULD PREVENT PROPER SELECTION OF "NSP
ENCRYPTION SELECT" FUNCTIONS "T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION
OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NOT HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE
SWITCH'S FUNCTION. RECOMMEND FMEA UPGRADE TO 2/2 (CIL STATUS).
AFTER NASA FMEA/CIL REEVALUATION, NASA REASSIGNED CRITICALITY
FROM 2/IR TO 2/2. IOA AND NASA NOW AGREE.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-7
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-1056
NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21803-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM& TRACK
1056
ENCRYPTION ZEROIZE/NORMAL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BRIDGING SHORT IN SWITCH COULD CAUSE INADVERTENT ZEROIZING OF THE
KEY, CAUSING LOSS OF ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF
MISSION. IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED CRITICALITY 3/2R BASED ON NON
VIABLE FAILURE FOR BOTH SETS OF CONTACTS TO FAIL SINCE
SWITCH IS NOT USED DURING FLIGHT.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-8
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-1068
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-22000-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM& TRACK
1068
UPLINK BLOCK SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 1068 ASSIGNS 2/IR FOR ORBIT OPS - LOSS OF MISSION PLUS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE FOR FAILURE OF ALL PATHS FOR STATE
VECTOR UPDATE. (NASA FMEA WRITEUP ACKNOWLEDGES THE IR FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY BUT FMEA ASSIGNS FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY 2).
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON ORBITER WIRING CHANGES
WHICH PREVENTS LOSS OF STATE VECTOR UPDATE UPON SWITCH FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-9
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4001
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4001
KU BD EA-I (INTERFACE AND CONTROLUNIT)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4002
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5200-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
4002
KU BD EA-2 (RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-II
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMTRK-4002A
05-2R-5200-2
COMMAND TRACK
4002
KU BD EA-2
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
(RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COM]4 FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4003
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5400-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
_{EW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4003
KU BD SPA (SIGNAL PROCESSOR ASSY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4003A
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5400-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4003
KU BD SPA (SIGNAL PROCESSORASSY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-4005
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4005
KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4005B
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4005
KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4006
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4006
KU BD DEA (DEPLOYEDELECTRONIC ASSY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4007
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4007
KU BD DMA (DEPLOYEDMECHANICAL ASSY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-4009
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4009
KU BD DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4010
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4010
KU BD DMA (DEPLOYEDMECHANICALASSY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-20
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4011
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4011
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-21
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4012
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC I D:
ITEM :
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
COMM AND TRACK
4012
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1
W. C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-22
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-4013
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4013
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-23
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4014
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4014
KU BD COMMUP/FORWARDLINK MODE 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-24
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-4015
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4015
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-25
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4016
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
COMMAND TRACK
4016
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 2
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-26
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-4017
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4017
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-27
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4018
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4018
KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE 1 CHANNEL1
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-28
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4019
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4019
KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE 1 CHANNEL2
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-29
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4020
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4020
KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE 1 CHANNEL 3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-30
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4021
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4021
KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE2
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-31
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4022
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4022
KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_ [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-32
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-4023
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4023
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-33
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4024
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4024
KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-34
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4025
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4025
KU A PWRSW (REF NAVAIDS RR)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4026
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5112-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COM_4ANDTP_CK
4026
KU A PWRSW (REF NAVAIDS RR)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-36
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4027
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5113-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4027
KU A MODE SW (REF NAVAIDS RR)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-37
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-4028
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5113-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST :
COMM AND TRACK
4028
KU A MODE SW (REF NAVAIDS RR)
ASSESSMENT:
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-38
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4035
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5107-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4035
KU BD A ANT STEERING SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
.+ +
-.+_+
;+
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD PREVENT SELECTION OF OPTIMUM ANTENNA
STEERING MODE. NOT CRITICAL FUNCTION. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-4035A
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5107-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4O35
KU BD A ANT STEERING SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD PREVENT SELECTION OF OPTIMUM ANTENNA
STEERING MODE. NOT CRITICAL FUNCTION. NASA FMEA 05-2R-5107-2
WAS COMBINED WITH 5107-1 AND DELEATED DURING THE NASA
REEVALUATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4036
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5107-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4036
KU BD A ANT STEERING SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ P ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN/SHORT FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF KUCOMM. ANALYSIS ONLY
COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR AND COMM
FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION COVERED
UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE
NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO
ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-41
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4041
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4041
KU BD ANT A PYRO ARM/SAFE SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. SHOULD BE COVERED IN NASA FMEA.
IOA AGREES WITH THE NEWLY GENERATED NASA FMEA/CIL 05-6EI-2001-I
(2/24/88, CRITICALITY i/i), WHICH ADDRESSES THIS IOA CRITICALITY
ASSESSMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-4042
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4042
KU BD ANT A PYRO ARM/SAFE SW
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. SHOULD BE COVERED IN NASA FMEA.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA GENERATED FMEA 05-6EI-2001-2 (2/24/88,
CRITICALITY 3/IR), WHICH ADDRESSES THIS IOA CRITICALITY
ASSESSMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4043
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
4043
KU BD ANT A PYRO JETT/SAFE SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. SHOULD BE COVERED IN NASA FMEA.
IOA AGREES WITH THE NEWLY GENERATED NASA FMEA/CIL 05-6EI-2002-I
(2/24/88, CRITICALITY I/I), WHICH ADDRESSES THIS IOA CRITICALITY
ASSESSMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-4044
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
4044
KU BD ANT A PYRO JETT/SAFE SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. SHOULD BE COVERED IN NASA FMEA.
IOA AGREES WITH THE NEWLY GENERATED NASA FMEA/CIL 05-6EI-2002-2
(2/24/88, CRITICALITY i/i), WHICH ADDRESSES THIS IOA CRITICALITY
ASSESSMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/10/88
A_SESSMENTID: COMTRK-4514
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4514
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO CORRESPONDING FMEA IN FMEA/CIL PACKET.
IOA AGREES WITH THE NEWLY GENERATED NASA FMEA/CIL 05-6EI-2000-I
(2/24/88, CRITICALITY I/IRB), WHICH ADDRESSES THIS IOA
CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-5010
NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM & TRACK
5010
UHF SIMPLEX POWER SWITCH
LEAD _NALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ I [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONTACT-TO-CONTACT BRIDGING SHORT HOLDING A FAILED PA IN THE UHF
RF TRANSMIT CIRCUIT COULD PREVENT UHF USE FOR ATC/LANDING OPS.
FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE. NASA
ASSIGNED CRITICALITY OF 3/3 FOR EVA AND 2/IR FOR OTHER MISSION
PHASES. NASA FMEA 05-2B-22104-I WAS ASSIGNED THE HIGHEST
CRITICALITY OF 2/IR. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA
CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO
ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
1/15/88
COMTRK-5502
05-6PB-22107-2
COMM& TRACK
5502
CIRCUIT BREAKER, UHF, MNC
A.W. ADDIS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BOTH CIRCUIT BREAKERS (CBI3, CBI8) ARE NORMALLY CLOSED. ONE
(CBI8) COULD FAIL OPEN AND CONDITION WOULD NOT BE DETECTED IN
FLIGHT BECAUSE OTHER (CBI3) WOULD BE PROVIDING POWER TO BOTH XCVR
AND TO PA, SO FAILS SCREEN B. IOA 5502 COVERS EVA OPS;
IOA 5503 COVERS FLIGHT OPS VOICE COMM WITH GROUND. IOA ACCEPTS
NASA FMEA SCREEN B PASS CRITERIA ON THE BASIS THAT CIRCUIT
BREAKERS COULD BE ROUTINELY CYCLED ON AND OFF TO CHECK OPERATION
DURING FLIGHT. ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT A NORMAL PROCEDURE, IT COULD
ACCOMPLISH THE IN-FLIGHT READILY DETECTABLE FAILURE REQUIREMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-5503
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PB-22107-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM& TRACK
5503
CIRCUIT BREAKER, UHF, MNC
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
BOTH CIRCUIT BREAKERS (CBI3, CBI8) ARE NORMALLY CLOSED. ONE
(CBI8) COULD FAIL OPEN AND CONDITION WOULD NOT BE DETECTED IN
FLIGHT BECAUSE OTHER (CBI3) WOULD BE PROVIDING POWER TO BOTH XCVR
AND TO PA, SO FAILS SCREEN B. IOA 5502 COVERS EVA OPS;
IOA 5503 COVERS FLIGHT OPS VOICE COMM WITH GROUND. IOA ACCEPTS
NASA FMEA SCREEN B PASS CRITERIA ON THE BASIS THAT CIRCUIT
BREAKERS COULD BE ROUTINELY CYCLED ON AND OFF TO CHECK OPERATION
DURING FLIGHT. ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT A NORMAL PROCEDURE, IT COULD
ACCOMPLISH THE IN-FLIGHT READILY DETECTABLE FAILURE REQUIREMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-7026A
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
7026
RENDEZVOUSRADAR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
E ] [ ] E ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION. IOA AGREES
WITH NASA FMEA/CIL CRITICALITY 2/2 FOR RADAR FUNCTION.
OVERLOOKED DURING INITIAL REVIEW SINCE MAIN FMEA PERTAINED TO KU
COMM AND RADAR CRITICALITY SHOWED UP AS A SECONDARY PART OF THE
FMEA AS A 2/2 CRITICALITY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-7027A
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
7027
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED k_-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KU-BAND RR FUNCTION. IOA AGREES
WITH
NASA FMEA/CIL CRITICALITY 2/2 FOR RADAR FUNCTION. OVERLOOKED
DURING INITIAL REVIEW SINCE MAIN FMEA PERTAINED TO KU COMM AND
RADAR CRITICALITY SHOWED UP AS A SECONDARY PART OF THE FMEA AS A
2/2 CRITICALITY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-7028A
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM]
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMMAND TRACK
7028
RR EA-I (INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT)
W.C. LONG
[REF KU
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KU-BAND RR FUNCTION. IOA AGREES
WITH
NASA FMEA/CIL CRITICALITY 2/2 FOR RADAR FUNCTION. OVERLOOKED
DURING INITIAL REVIEW SINCE MAIN FMEA PERTAINED TO KU COMM AND
RADAR CRITICALITY SHOWED UP AS A SECONDARY PART OF THE FMEA AS A
2/2 CRITICALITY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-7034
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
7034
RR DMA (DEPLOYEDMECHANICAL ASSY) [REF KU COMM]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA KU-BAND RADAR FMEA. FAILURE TO START/STOP
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF RADAR FUNCTION.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA/CIL 05-2R-5300-I (CRIT-2/2) FOR RADAR
FUNCTION. OVERLOOKED DURING INITIAL ASSESSMENT DUE TO SEVERAL
CRITICALITIES AND FUNCTION BEING INCLUDED ON ONE FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-7038
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
7038
KU-BAND POWERSWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] ,
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA KU-BAND RADAR FMEA.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF KU-BAND SYSTEM.
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
FAILURE TO REMAIN CLOSED
LOSS OF RADAR WOULD
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA/CIL 05-2R-5112-I (CRIT-2/2) FOR RADAR
FUNCTION. FAILURE MODE "OPEN" PRESENTS SAME EFFECT AS FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-7044
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
7044
SLEW AZIMUTH CONTROLSWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION. IOA ACCEPTS
NASA FMEA CRITICALITY 3/2R FOR RADAR FUNCTION. NORMALLY RADAR
EMPLOYS AUTOMATIC ANTENNA TRACKING/SLEWING SO THAT USE OF MANUAL
SLEWING REQUIRES A PRIOR FAILURE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-7046
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5104-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
7046
SLEW ELEV CONTROL SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION. IOA ACCEPTS
NASA FMEA CRITICALITY 3/2R FOR RADAR FUNCTION. NORMALLY RADAR
EMPLOYS AUTOMAATIC ANTENNA TRACKING/SLEWING SO THAT USE OF MANUAL
SLEWING REQUIRES A PRIOR FAILURE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPEGTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001A
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.18
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-58
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001B
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-59
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001C
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-60
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001D
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.23
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COM}IAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-61
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001E
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-62
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001F
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
C ] *
CX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-63
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001G
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-64
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
AssESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001H
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-65
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001I
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-66
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001J
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-67
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001K
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-68
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8001L
1.2.9
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-69
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001M
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-70
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001N
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.11
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-71
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-80010
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COM}IAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-72
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001P
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.13
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-73
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8001Q
1.2.14
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [p] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-74
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001R
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.15
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-75
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001S
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.16
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CO_ AND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO T}_T THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-76
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8001T
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-77
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMTRK-8001U
1.2.19
COMM AND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-78
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8001V
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.20
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8001
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-79
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-80
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8002A
1.2.18
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8O02
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-81
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8002B
1.2.21
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-82
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8002C
1.2.22
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-83
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8002D
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-84
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002E
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-85
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8002F
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CO_ AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-86
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002G
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-87
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8002H
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8002I
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-89
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8002J
1.2.7
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-90
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002K
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-91
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8002L
1.2.9
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X j
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-92
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8002M
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8002N
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM :
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-94
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-80020
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-95
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8002P
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.13
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8002Q
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.14
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-97
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002R
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-98
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8002S
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.16
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-99
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8002T
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I00
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8002U
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.19
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ J [ J [ J [ J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I01
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8002V
1.2.20
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8002
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I02
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003A
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.18
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VA.qIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.!9-I04
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003B
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003C
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I06
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003D
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [p] [p]
[N] IN] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I07
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003E
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I08
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMTRK-8003F
1.2.3
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [p] [P]
[P] [p] [p]
C ] C ] [ ]
[ ] ,
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003G
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-II0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003H
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-III
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003I
NASA FMEA #: i_2.6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE_IARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003J
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMTRK-8003K
1.2.8
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003L
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.9
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003M
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003N
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-80030
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-I18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003P
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8O03
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-119
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003Q
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-120
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003R
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-121
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8003S
1.2.16
COMM AND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-122
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003T
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8OO3
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-123
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMTRK-8003U
1.2.19
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-124
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8003V
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.20
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8003
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-125
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8008
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-126
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8008A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERAA (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-127
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8008B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
W.C. LONG
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C x ] *
CX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 _ND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-128
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8008C
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERAA (FWD P/n BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8008D
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERAA (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-130
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8008E
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-131
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8008F
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERAA (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-132
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8008G
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERAa (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-133
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8008H
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERAA (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-134
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8008I
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERAA (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-135
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008J
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8008
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-136
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8008K
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8O08
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-137
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
COMMAND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERAC (AFT P/n BAY)
W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON _D RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-138
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-139
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-140
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009C
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-141
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009D
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
_REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-142
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009E
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-143
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009F
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-144
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009G
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-145
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009H
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-146
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009I
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-147
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009J
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-148
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8009K
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8009
TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-149
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA :
COMTRK-80 i0 BASELINE [ ]
2.1.1 NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-150
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8010A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-151
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8010B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-152
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8010C
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-153
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8010D
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-154
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8OIOE
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-155
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8010F
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-156
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8010G
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
{ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-157
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8010M
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-158
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8010I
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-159 "_
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8010J
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), _D IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-160
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8010K
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / _ [ ] [ J [ J [ J
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-161
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8011
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-162
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8011A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-163
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8011B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-164
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8011C
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] IX]*
[P] [x]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-165
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8011D
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-166
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8011E
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-167
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8011F
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-168
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011G
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-169
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8011H
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (_MS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
CX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-170
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8011I
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-171
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8011J
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDanCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-172
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8011K
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
8011
TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), _D IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-173
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8014
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-174
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8014A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-175
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8014B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDanCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-176
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8014C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-177
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8014D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-178
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8014E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM_{D TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-179
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8014F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-180
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8014G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8014
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-181
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8015
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-182
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMTRK-8015A
2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
E ] E ] E ]
[p] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-183
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8015B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-184
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8015C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-185
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMTRK-8015D
2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-186
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8015E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8015F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8015G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-189
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8015H
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-190
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8016A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8016B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8016C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8016D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8016E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-196
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8016F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8016G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8016
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREN VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8017
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8017A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-200
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8017B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPOk_ DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-201
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8017C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-202
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8017D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-203
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8017E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-204
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8017F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-205
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8017G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-206
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8018
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COM24AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-207
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8018A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-208
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8018B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-209
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8018C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESUL_ _ IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-210
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-211
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-212
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-213
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-214
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018H
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ']
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8018
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-215
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-216
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-217
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-218
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8019C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-219
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-220
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-221
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-222
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8OI9G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8019
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TOPERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-223
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-224
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-225
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020B
NASA FMF2% #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-226
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMTRK- 8020C
2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-227
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY, NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-228
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-229
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-230
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8020G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMANDTRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-231
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOAACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-232
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-233
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-234
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-235
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-236
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-237
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-238
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-239
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021H
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-240
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021I
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8021
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-241
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-242
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-243
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-244
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-245
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-246
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-247
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8022F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-248
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8022
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-249
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-250
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-251
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-252
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8023C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST : W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-253
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-254
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-255
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-256
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8023
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-257
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-258
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-259
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-260
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-261
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-262
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-263
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-264
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-265
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024H
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-266
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-267
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-268
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-269
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R) , AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-270
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-271
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTVAND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOWAND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-272
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-273
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8025
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-274
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8033
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8033
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-275
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8033A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8033
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-276
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8033B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8033
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-277
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CO_-8034
2.1.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8034
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-278
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8035
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAY)
COMMAND TRACK
8035
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION
WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-279
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8035A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAY)
COMM AND TRACK
8035
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION
WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-280
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8035B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAY )
COMMAND TRACK
8035
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-281
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8036
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAY)
COMM AND TRACK
8036
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAST FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-282
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8037
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8037
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-283
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8037A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8037
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-284
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8037B
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8037
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-285
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8038
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8038
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-286
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8039
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8039
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON
TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS
ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-287
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8039A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8039
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON
TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS
ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY .
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-288
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8040
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8040
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONCOULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-289
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8056
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8056
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION.LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS
VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-290
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8056A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8056
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-291
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8060
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8060
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR) , AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-292
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8060A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8060
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTVAND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-293
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8069
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8069
TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON GCIL
REDUNDANCY. GCIL CAN SELECT CCTVMNA OR MNB POWER THROUGH
DEDICATED DRIVERS THUS PROVIDING TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR
THIS ITEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-294
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8070
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8070
TV PWRCNTL UNIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON GCIL
REDUNDANCY. GCIL CAN SELECT CCTV MNA OR MNB POWER THROUGH
DEDICATED DRIVERS THUS PROVIDING TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR
THIS ITEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-295
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8074
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8074
TV SYNC SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-296
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8077
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8077
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-297
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8078
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8078
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-298
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8079
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8079
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC B)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-299
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8080
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8080
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC B)
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-300
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8081
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8081
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-301
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8082
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8082
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-302
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8083
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8083
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 J [ J [ J [ J
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-303
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8084
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8084
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC D)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-304
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8095
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8095
TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20250-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-305
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8096
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8096
TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20250-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-306
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8097
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8097
TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20251-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-307
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8098
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8098
TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20251-2. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
212.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-308
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8099
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8099
TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20252-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-309
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8100
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8100
TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20252-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-310
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8101
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-
COMM AND TRACK
8101
TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20214-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-311
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8102
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8102
TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20214-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-312
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8103
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8103
TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20215-2. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-313
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8104
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8104
TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20215-2. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-314
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8123
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8123
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC A FWD BAY SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20227-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-315
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8124
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8124
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC A SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20227-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/1R OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8125
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8125
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC B KEEL/EVA SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20228-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2,
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8126
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8126
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC B SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20228-2. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8127
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8127
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC C AFT BAY SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20260-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8128
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8128
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC C SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20260-2. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8129
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8129
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC D RMS STBD SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20229-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8130
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8130
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC D SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20229-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8243
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8243
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8244
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8244
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8245
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8245
TVC B MONOCHROMELENS ASSY FOCUSCONTROLSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROL MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8246
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8246
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8247
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8247
TVC C MONOCHROMELENS ASSY FOCUSCONTROLSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8248
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8248
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8249
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8249
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THERFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8250
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8250
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-330
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8259
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8259
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-331
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8260
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8260
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-332
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8261
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8261
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THAY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-333
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8262
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8262
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-334
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8263
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8263
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-335
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8264
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8264
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-336
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8265
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8265
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-337
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8266
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8266
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-338
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8275
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8275
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-339
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8276
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8276
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-340
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8277
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8277
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-341
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8278
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8278
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-342
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8279
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8279
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-343
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8280
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8280
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-344
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8281
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8281
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-345
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8282
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8282
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA cCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-346
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8303
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8303
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-347
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8304
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8304
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-348
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8305
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8305
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-349
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8306
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8306
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-350
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8307
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8307
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-351
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8308
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8308
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINKAND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-352
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8309
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8309
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988
\
C.19-353
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8310
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8310
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-354
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8311
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8311
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-355
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8312
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8312
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-356
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8313
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8313
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-357
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8314
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8314
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-358
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8315
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8315
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-359
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8316
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8316
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-360
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8317
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8317
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-361
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8318
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8318
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-362
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8319
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8319
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-363
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8320
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8320
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-364
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8321
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8321
TVC D COLORLENS ASSY FOCUSCONTROLSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-365
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8322
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
8322
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-366
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8323
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8323
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-367
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8324
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8324
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINKAND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-368
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8325
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8325
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-369
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8326
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8326
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-370
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8328
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SWITCH
COMM AND TRACK
8328
RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
THIS MDAC FMEA ID-8328 WAS PREVIOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE CIL LIST BY
AN ERRONEOUS "X" PLACED IN THE "IOA/CIL ITEM" SLOT ON THE
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8363
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8363
CONSOLE MONITOR PWR SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8364
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8364
CONSOLE MONITOR PWR SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8368
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8368
CONSOLE MONITOR SYNC SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8374
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
8374
CONSOLE MONITOR SOURCE SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ _ [ ] [ _ [ _*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8376
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SW
COMM AND TRACK
8376
CONSOLE MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8505
CB 39 FWD BAY TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20115-i. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8507
CB 40 FWD BAY TVC HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ONE FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20116-i. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8509
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
8509
CB 41 FWDBAY P/T HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20117-I. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8511
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20201-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
8511
CB 34 AFT BAY TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20112-I. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8513
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
8513
CB 35 AFT BAY TVC HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20113-i. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8515
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8515
CB 36 AFT BAY P/T HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20114-i. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8517
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20201-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8517
CB 45 KEEL/EVA TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20118-i. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8519
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20201-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8519
CB 46 KEEL/EVA TVC HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /!R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20119-I. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8521
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
8521
CB 47 KEEL/EVA P/T HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20120-i. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
212.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-385
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8525
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8525
CB 51 STBD RMS TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. STBD NOT USED ON PRESENT MISSION.
NO FMEA REQUIRED FOR STBD RMS.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-386
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8527
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8527
CB 52 STBD RMS TVC HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. STBD RMS NOT USED ON PRESENT
MISSIONS.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20201-I. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8529
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8529
CB 53 STBD RMS P/T HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. STBD RMS NOT USED ON PRESENT
MISSIONS.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20211-i. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8531
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20101-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8531
CB 55 PORT RMS TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OTHER TVCs AND CREW VIEWING COULD BE CONSIDERED AS UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY AND LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONS
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMING THE SYSTEM
LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8533
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
8533
CB 56 PORT RMS TVC HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
OTHER TVCs AND CREW VIEWING COULD BE CONSIDERED AS UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY AND LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONS
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMING THE SYSTEM
LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-8535
NASA FMEA #: 06-6PK-20102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8535
CB 57 PORT RMS P/T HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
{ADD/DELET_ )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OTHER TVCs AND CREW VIEWING COULD BE CONSIDERED AS UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY AND LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONS
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMING THE SYSTEM
LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-391
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-10502
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
10502
EMU/TV-BATTERY PACK
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO NASA COMM & TRACK COUNTERPART. CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE THAT
SHOULD BE COVERED BY NASA POWER DIVISION. NASA INITIALLY HAD A
COMPARABLE FMEA/CIL, BUT NASA CONSOLIDATED BATTERY RELATED CILS
AND RESOLUTION ACTION ASSIGNED TO NASA EPS/BATERY SECTION,
LITHIUM CELL EVALUATION.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-392
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-II007
NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24800-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
11O07
GCIL DRIVER, NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 11007 REFERS TO NSP ONLY, NASA FMEA COVERS ENTIRE S-BAND
SYSTEM, AND RELATES THE 3/IR CRITICALITY TO LOSS OF THE TWO S-
BAND PM STRINGS, LEAVING ONLY UHF VOICE FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES.
A SINGLE FMEA CANNOT COVER ALL THE POTENTIAL DEGREES
OF CRITICALITY FOR THE S-BAND PM SYSTEM. LOSS OF FIRST NSP
DOWNLINK CALLS FOR MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT, AND THUS QUALIFIES AS
2/IR.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE INTERPRETATION THAT A
MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT DOES NOT REPRESENT A LOSS OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-393
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/14/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-24066X
NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
SENSOR
COMMAND TRACK
24066
KU BD DMA (DEPLOYEDELECTRONICASSY) TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT DOES NOT HINDER HEATER OPERATON. A SECOND
FAILURE, THE THERMOSTAT, COULD ALLOW FOR OVERHEATING OR FREEZING
RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO GIMBAL THUS JEOPARDIZING THE SECURING OF
DA. FLIGHT DIRECTOR MAY CURTAIL MISSION TO PRECLUDE THIS.
IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-394
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/14/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-27056X
NASA FMEA #: 05-2C-22200-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDAC ID: 27056
ITEM: TACAN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING NEAR IN OPERATION S-BAND OR UHF VOICE LINK SHOULD PROVIDE
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY, BUT UNDER WORST CASE CONDITIONS
IMMEDIATELY AFTER BLACKOUT STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY MAY BE
LOSS. NASA FMEA 05-2C-22200-4 DELETED. NO LONGER A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE. HARDWARE WAS REDESIGNED.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-395
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-28378X
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
28378
PAN AND TILT UNIT LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR
RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-396
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-28380X
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
28380
PAN AND TILT UNIT LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-397
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-28384X
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
28384
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] IN] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR
RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-398
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-28386X
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
28386
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-399
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-28388X
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND TRACK
28388
MONOCHROMELENS ASSEMBLYIRIS LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-400
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-28390X
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SWITCH
COMM AND TRACK
28390
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR
RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-401
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-28394X
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
28394
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-402
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-28396X
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SWITCH
COMM AND TRACK
28396
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-403
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: COMTRK-28400X
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
28400
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR
RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-404
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-28402X
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMM AND TRACK
28402
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-405
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 3/16/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CO_RK-28404X
5.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
28404
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 26 JULY 1988 C.19-406
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